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ABSTRACT

Prior to the 2004 federal election the Australian Greens were rising as the third force in
the Australian political system. At the 2001 election they secured an increased share of
the vote and returned a second Senator. Conversely the Australian Democrats, held to
be the third force in Australian politics went backwards in 2001, losing a Senate seat.
From 2001 to 2004 the Greens polled strongly and were buoyed by increased support
for their anti-Iraq war and pro-refugee positions. As a party they appeared to be moving
beyond single-issue status. Equally the Democrats were suffering from internal disunity
and their support collapsed. By the time of the 2004 election the Greens were expected
to win enough Senate seats to at least share the balance of power in the Senate. These
high expectations were held by political commentators and the Greens themselves,
buoyed by strong polling. This dissertation examines the expectations placed on the
Greens. While it was found that expectations were too high, the Greens nevertheless
had the capacity to perform better than they did in the Senate.

The Greens'

underperformance at the 2004 federal election is generally consistent with 'constraints
theory'. While institutional barriers to minor party representation in the Australian
parliament provided the greatest constraint on the Greens' election performance, this
dissertation also examines the impact of government and media attacks on the Greens
during the 2004 election campaign and the Australian Embassy bombing on the Greens'
election results.
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CHAPTERl
iNTRODUCTION

The Australian Greens were expected to perfonn strongly at the 2004 federal election.
Underpinning support for the Greens was growing public disaffection toward the major
parties over their positions on the Iraq war and asylum seekers. At the start of the 2004
election campaign, opinion polls, the Commentariat and the Greens' leadership were
fuelling expectations that the Greens could win between four and seven Senate seats and
either hold the balance of power in their own right or share it with the remaining
Democrat Senators. Greens' leader Bob Brown even raised the possibility of the Greens
winning seats in the House of Representatives and determining which of the major
parties fonned government in the event of a hung parliament (Bachelard & Denholm,
2004; ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004). The Greens, however, fell well short of
these expectations. Only two Greens' candidates were elected to the Senate, increasing
their total to four. The Greens did not win election to the House ofRepresentatives and
their only sitting member, Michael Organ, lost his seat of Cunningham (Newman, 2005,
p.65-73). They even failed to win the three Senate seats they needed to secure o1t1ciai
parliamentary party status. On the other hand the Howard government was returned for
a fourth consecutive tenn with an increased majority in the House of Representatives
and control of the Senate - the first time a government controlled the Senate in 24 years
(Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403-4).

The disparity between the expectations that the Greens would perform strongly and the
outcome of the 2004 election raises the question of whether the Greens under perfonned
or whether expectations were in fact too high. Analysis of the expectations placed on
the Greens, suggests that they were too high.

However, the Greens should have

performed better than they did in the Senate. After establishing that the Greens shouid
have had four candidates elected to the Senate, 'constraints theory' is utilised to provide
an explanation for why the Greens under perfonned at the 2004 federal election.
'Constraints theory' is a convenient tenn for the Jaensch and Mathieson's (1998, pp.213) application ofHauss and Rayside's (1978) theory of party fonnation to the study of
minor parties in Australia. Wniie government and media attacks on the Greens and the
terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta were the major issues the Greens
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confronted during the 2004 election campaign, institutional barriers provided the
greatest constraint on the Greens' election performance.

This study provides a contribution to the study of minor parties in Australia.

In

particular, it provides an original contribution to the study of the Australian Greens.
Despite being founded over a decade ago, the Australian Greens remain relatively
neglected by Australian political scientists. It also provides an account of the Greens'
performance at the 2004 election, something that has been inadequately considered.

Methodology
A wide range of resources were utilised for information on the Greens at the 2004
election, including newspaper reports, election data, parliamentary reports, press
releases and, where they were available, journal articles.

An analysis of the 2004

Senate election results was undertaken to determine the extent to which the electoral
system and Senate preferences affected the Greens' election results. A content analysis
of news reports and opinion pieces in Australia's major national and state newspapers
was undertaken to establish whether there was bias against the Greens as a prerequisite
to determining whether it damaged the Greens' electoral support. The newspapers
included in the content analysis were T'he Australian, The Sydney Morning Herald,
Herald Sun, The Age, The Courier Mail, The West Australian, The Advertiser and The
Mercury.

News reports were classified as 'unfavourable', 'neutral' or 'favourable'.

These categories refer to whether the content of a news story reflected positively or
negatively on the Greens.

The results of the content analysis are contained in

Appendices Hand I. Opinion poll data and data from the Australian Election Study
(AES) 2001 and 2004 were utilised to determine the impact of the government and
media attacks on the Greens. Opinion poll data were also used to determine the impact
of the terrorist bombing on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on the Greens' election
results. While opinion poll data at the national level provides a crude measure for
gauging support for the Greens, it was the only measure that was readily available.
While the 2001 and 2004 AES data show respondents' attitudes toward the Greens
changed, it does not indicate what changed their attitudes and at what time between the
200 I and 2004 elections attitudinal change occurred.
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Findings
This study found that the expectations placed on the Greens in the lead up to the 2004
federal election were too high. However, a comparison of polling on the Greens with
the Democrats' Senate election results in 1998 and 2001 suggests the Greens under
performed by only having two candidates elected to the Senate in 2004. An analysis of
why the Greens under performed found that institutional barriers provided the greatest
constraint on the Greens' election perfonnance. The content analysis of press coverage
on the Greens during the election campaign revealed that only the Herald Sun's
coverage was biased against the Greens. However, opinion polls and AES data indicate
that the attacks on the Greens by government, minor parties, interest groups and
sections of the media did not have a detrimental impact on the Greens' election results.
Unexpectedly the terrorist bombing on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta was found to
have had the greatest impact on support for the Greens. However, it was insufficient to
overcome the institutional constraints that stifled the Greens' election performance.
While 'constraints theory' provides an adequate explanatory framework for assessing
the Greens' underperformance, it was unable to explain why some Greens' voters
shifted their support to the Howard government following the Jakarta bombing. This
suggests 'constraints theory' could be extended to include terrorism as a potential
political constraint on the electoral success of minor parties.

Chapter Outline
Chapter Two shows the expectations placed on the Greens in the lead up to the 2004
federal election were too high, but that they still under pertormed. After outlining the
rise of the Australian Greens this Chapter shows how opinion polls, the Commentariat
and the Greens' leadership all fuelled expectations of a strong Greens' electoral

perfonna."lce.

A comparison of polling on the Greens during the 2004 election

campaign with the Democrats' Senate eiection results in 1998 and 2001 suggests the
Greens had the capacity to perform better than they did in the Senate. However, while it
was plausible for commentators to predict that the Greens could win four Senate seats,
their predictions of five to seven seats were unrealistic. Claims by the Greens that they
could win lower House seats were also unrealistic because minor party candidates have
historically failed to win election to the House of Representatives.
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Having showed that the Greens under performed in Chapter Two, Chapter Three utilises
'constraints theory' as a theoretical framework for explaining why the Greens under
perfonned. 'Constraints theory' contends that institutional, political and internal party
factors constrain the electoral success of minor parties. Institutional factors include the
Australian electoral system and the stability of Australia's two party system. Political
factors encompass the behaviour of the major parties, economic conditions, whether a
minor party has geographically based support and the media. Internal factors include
the popularity and profile of a party's leader, finances and resources, ideology and
policy and party experience (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp21-3, 173-196).

Chapter Four shows the Greens' underperformance at the 2004 federal election is
relatively consistent with 'constraints theory'.

While the electoral system was the

dominant constraint on the Greens this Chapter also considers the impact of
government, minor party, interest group and media attacks on the Greens during the
2004 election campaign. A content analysis of Australia's major newspapers is used to
assess whether there was systematic bias against the Greens during the campaign
period. The full details of the content analysis are contained in Appendices H and I.
While the Greens had limited media opportunities to counter the attacks on them the
available evidence suggests the attacks did not have a detrimental impact on their
election results. The 9 September 2004 terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in
Jakarta has been neglected in analyses of the Greens' election results. Opinion polis
suggest the Embassy bombing had the most detrimental impact on the Greens' vote.
However, even without the loss of support caused by the bombing the Greens would not
have been able to surmount the institutional barriers that constrained their performance.

Whilst the 2004 federal election saw Greens' representation in parliament equal the
Democrats', the Greens under performed.

Political commentators and the Greens'

leadership expected the Greens to become the clear third force in Australian politics.
Current opinion polling and Commentariat analysis indicates that the Greens remain on
the rise while the Democrats continue to flat line (AC Nielsen, 2005; Roy Morgan
Research, 2003a).

The next election may well see a further rise in Greens'

parliamentary representation. If this occurs the 2004 result will be no more than a
stepping-stone in the emergence of the Greens as a serious force in Australian politics.
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CHAPTER2

GREEN EXPECTATIONS: A BRIDGE TOO FAR?

In the lead up to the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens appeared poised to gain
omcial parliamentary party status and to eclipse the Democrats as Australia's third
parliamentary force.

1

Opinion polls, the Commentariat and the Greens' leadership

fuelled expectations of a strong Greens' election result. At the start of the campaign the
various opinion polls showed support for the Greens running at between 6 and 9.5
percent (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004; Roy Morgan Research,
2003a). TI1e Commentariat were predicting the Greens could win between four and
seven Senate seats. The Greens' leadership was optimistic of winning Senate seats in
every state and the ACT. Greens' leader Bob Brown was also confident of winning
seats in the House ofRepresentatives. He even raised the prospect of an accord with the
major parties in the event that the Greens held the balance of power in a hung
parliament (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004). These
expectations, however, were too high. The Greens had just two additional Senators
elected at the 2004 election, bringing their total to four, and they failed to win a seat in
the House of Representatives. After outlining the electoral rise of the Greens this
Chapter analyses the expectations of a strong Greens' result in 2004. A comparison of
Greens' polling during the campaign with the Democrats' Senate results in 1998 and
200 I suggests that expectations placed on the Greens were too high. However, they had
scope to perform better than they did in the Senate. Claims by the Greens that they
would enter the House of Representatives were always a bridge too fur.

The Rise of the Australian Greens
Support for the Greens has steadily increased since the party was founded in August
1992 (Brown & Singer, 1996, pp.84-5). Table 1 shows the increase in the Greens'
primary vote between the 1993 and 2001 federal elections. In 1993 the Greens fielded
just 56 House of Representatives' candidates and won just 1.9 percent ofthe House of
Representatives' primary vote. They performed slightly better in the Senate winning
2.9 percent of the primary vote.

The most notable feature of the Greens' debut

1

Official party status is achieved with five seats. If affords parties extra sta.f't: office space and general
resource assistance (Parliamentary Entitlements Act, 1990).
5

campaign was Bob Brown's contest in the Tasmanian seat ofDenison. Brown secured
14.2 percent ofthe primary vote but failed to be elected to the House ofRepresentatives
(AEC, 1999). In 1996 the Greens' vote increased slightly and Brown was elected to the
Senate for Tasmania with 8.7 percent of the statewide primmy vote (Newman, 2005,
Despite fielding more candidates at the 1998 federal election the Greens'

p.70).

primary vote fell slightly in both chambers.

In the House of Representatives they

received 2.6 percent of the primary vote and in the Senate they received 2.7 percent.

Table 1

The Greens' House ofRepresentatives and Senate Election Results 1993-2001. 2
-·-

Year House ~~~-~~-"~~----r--~-of Seats
Seats Senate
Seats Total ~·l
---,~1~~

I

Representatives

Contested

Won

Primary

Won

vote(%)

Primary Vote(%)

Semrturs

1

1993

1.9

56j

1996

2.9

106

0

32

1

2

1998

2.6

123

0

2.7

0

1

2001

5.0

150

0

4.9

2

2

0

2.9

1

2

Source: Australian Electoral Commission (1999); Newman, (2004).

The Greens' vote almost doubled at the 2001 election, doing so with a modest 22
percent rise in the number of House of Representative seats the party contested
compared to the 1998 election. For the first time the Greens fielded candidates in all
House of Representatives divisions and received 5.0 percent of the national vote. In the
Senate the Greens received 4.9 percent of first preferences and under the Senate's
proportional representation voting system, won two seats, in Tasmania and New South
Wales (Newman, 2005, p.54; Singleton, Aitkin, Warhurst & Jinks, 2003, p.326). The
increase in the Greens' vote in the 2001 fuderal election came largely as a consequence
of their opposition to the Howard government's poiicies on border protection and
asylum seekers rather than increased public concern for the environment (Rootes, 2002,
p.150; Economou, 2002, p.2; Lohrey, 2002, p.56). The convergence of the major
parties on boarder protection provided the Greens with an electoral advantage by

~ Shows t.~e combined vote of the Australia.>J. Greens a.>J.d t.~e Greens (WA). The Greens (WA) did not
formally join the Australian Greens until October 2003 (Greens (WA), 2004).
3
According to Christoff (1994, pp.359-360) Green candidates contested 59 House of Representatives
divisions in the 1993 federal election. This table has used Australian Electoral Commission (1999) data
which shows 56 seats.
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differentiating them fi·om both major parties. 4 Although the Greens did not win any
seats in the House of Representatives in 2001, Greens' candidate Michael Organ was
elected to the House of Representatives at the October 2002 Cunningham by-election.
Organ was ultimately able to win Cunningham because of the Liberal's decision not to
run a candidate (Lohrey, 2002, p.63).
Following the 2001 election support tor the Democrats declined substantially due to the
leadership struggle between Natasha Stott Despoja and Meg Lees, and the inability of
the Democrat party organisation to effectively deal with the parliamentary leadership
tensions. In contrast the Greens gained a significant degree of media attention because
of their stance on various issues. The Greens became widely known for their opposition
to the Howard govemment's policies on boarder protection and asylum seekers. They
also gained media attention from Bob Brown's very public opposition to the Howard
government's commitment to the US-led war on Iraq. The Greens gained widespread
media attention from Senators Bob Brown and Kerry Nettle's 'parliamentary protest'
during US President George W. Bush's address to a joint sitting of the Australian
parliament (Norman, 2004, p.208; Kingston, 2004, p.188).

They gained further

attention the following day when Brown and Nettle were forcefully prevented from
attending Chinese President Hu Jin Tao's address to a joint sitting of the Australian
parliament (Norman, 2004, p.209). The media's focus was also on the Greens in early
2005 when new Labor Leader Mark Latham toured Tasmania's Styx valley with Bob
Brown. The increased profile of the Greens helped to reinforce expectations that the
Greens were set to become the third parliamentary force at the 2004 federal election.

The Greens were expected to perfonn strongly at the 2004 election on the back of a
protest vote against the Howard Government. Journalist Malcohn Farr identified a
phenomenon he referred to as 'doctors' wives'. These were women who planned to
vote for the Greens because they wanted to punish the Howard government over its
policies on asylum seekers and Iraq. According to Kerr (2004, p.6):

The 'doctors' wives' are not seriously troubled by financial pressure and have
plenty of time to think about other issues. They have opposed the Government's
border protection policy and cannot forgive John Howard for Tampa. Now they
4

Major party convergence theory suggests the Liberal and Labor parties are becoming closer on the
Left/Right political spectrum as they vie for the middle ground. This forces centrist minor parties to the
Left or Right of the major parries (Vromen & Gelber, 2005, p.222). Border protection was an example of
major party convergence.
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are angty over Australia's presence in Iraq. They are appalled by the atrocities
committed on Iraqi prisoners and believe Australia has been tarnished. Like
most Australians they didn't want us to sign on for the war and now they are
ready to punish the government.
Farr specificaily warns that their backlash couid be felt in seats such as
Wentworth, and adds that the doctors' wives could also influence Senate
contests, with the Liberals the losers.
During the 2004 federal election campaign opinion polls showed the Greens out polling
all other minor parties, but they also provided a mixed picture as to the strength of
Greens' support. Newspoil had the Greens poiling between 6 and 8 percent during the
election campaign. In the last two weeks of the campaign Newspoll had support for the
Greens steady at 7 percent (Newspoll/The Australian, n.d.). 5 AC Nielsen had the
Greens polling at between 8 and 9 percent for most of the campaign. In the final week
of the campaign, however, AC Nielsen had the Greens at 7 percent (AC Nielsen, 2004).6
Morgan Poil had the Greens perfonning more strongly. Morgan Poil showed support
for the Greens between at 7.5 and 10.5 percent. In the week prior to the election
Morgan Poll had the Greens polling at 9.5 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a)? A
Herald Poll, conducted by AC Nielsen in the final week of the election campaign,
showed support for the Greens in the Senate at a high of 12 percent (Dodson, 2004;
Contractor, 2004; Coleman, 2004a; Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403). 8

Opinion polling indicated Greens' preferences were an important factor for the outcome
of the election (Saunders, 2004b). Throughout the election campaign all three opinion
polls showed Labor well behind the Coalition on primary votes. 9 However, up until the
last week of the campaign both Newspoll and Morgan Poll showed Labor either neck
and neck or ahead of the Coalition on a two party preferred basis. 10 AC Nielson was the
only opinion poll that showed Labor behind the Coalition on primary votes and the two
party preferred vote. I I

5

See Appendix A
See Appendix A L
7
See Appendix A2.
8
A Bulletin-Nine poll of more than 1000 people published on 29 September 2004 showed support for the
Greens in the Senate at 14 percent in South Australia, l3 percent in NSW and Queensland and 12 percent
in Victoria (Latham eyes Lodge but Greens the big movers, 2004).
9
See Appendices A to A.2.
10
See Appendix B and B.l.
11
See Appendix B.2.
6
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The Commentariat Gets it Wrong
Political commentators expected the Greens to win between four and seven Senate
seats. Foilowing the 2001 election Lohrey (2002, p.59) argued that based on voting
trends the Greens would overtake the Democrats as Australia's third political force at
the 2004 federal election. Her statistical analysis of the Democrats and the Greens'
1996, 1998 and 2001 election results showed a decline in the Democrat vote and an
increase in the Greens' vote. In the Senate the Democrat vote dropped from 10.8 per
--centin 1996 to 7.2 per-centin2UUL Jn_fue same-period-the-Greens' vote grew from 3.2
per cent to 4.9 percent. In line with the expected increase in the Greens' vote, Lohrey
(2002) predicted the Greens would win four Senate seats at the 2004 election, in NSW,
Victoria, Western Australia and Tasmania. The youth of the Greens in Queensland and
the strength of the Democrats in South Australia made it was more likely the sitting
Democrat Senators would hold their seats. Tne Greens were unlikely to win a Senate
place in the ACT or Northern Territory because no minor party had even come close to
reaching the 33.3 percent quota necessary to win (Lohrey, 2002, pp.60-3). However,
during the election campaign Lohrey (2004a; 2004b) predicted the Greens could win as
many as seven Senate seats. The best-case scenario incorporated the Greens winning
additional Senate seats in Queensland, South Australia and the ACT.

At the outset ofthe 2004 election campaign Professor Malcolm Mackerras predicted the
Greens would win a Senate seats in every state (Mackerras, 2004b; Manning & Rootes,
2005, p.403). He predicted that all three Democrat Senators who were up for reelection, and former Democrat leader turned founder of the Australian Progressive
Alliance, Meg Lees, would lose their seats. Mackerras, therefore, predicted that in the
new Senate the Coalition would hold 38 seats, Labor 26, the Greens 8 and the
Democrats 4 (Mackerras, 2004b). However, following the release of party preference
tickets and limited opinion polling on Senate voting intentions, Mackerras revised his
Senate prediction (Mackerras, 2004a). He concluded that Labor and the Greens would
not benefit from their preference deals and that the only certainty was that the
Coalition's vote would increase. His prediction about the Greens was revised down to
three seats.

He expected the Greens to only win in New South Wales, Western

Australia and Tasmania. Mackerras' revised prediction gave the Coalition 35 seats,
Labor 28, the Democrats 5, the Greens 5 and Family First 1 in the new Senate
(Mackerras, 2004a).

9

Antony Green, the ABC's election analyst, reached a different conclusion to that of
Mackerras. Based on his analysis of party voting tickets for the Senate, Green predicted
the Greens could win four to six Senate seats (Green, 2004). In New South Wales
Green predicted the Coalition would win three. seats and Labor two. He expected the
Greens to secure between 8 and I 0 percent ofthe primary vote and win the final Senate
place. Green believed the Coalition and Labor would each win three seats in Victoria.
The decision by conservative parties to channel preferences to Labor suggested a
deliberate attempt to split the state between the major parties to prevent the Greens from
winning. The decision by Labor and the Democrats to preference Family First ahead of
the Greens meant the Greens would require close to a quota ( 14.3 percent) in their own
right to win the final Senate place. In Queensland Green predicted the Liberals and
Labor would each win two seats with the Greens winning the fifth place and the
National's Barnaby Joyce the sixth Senate spot.

In Western Australia Green (2004) expected the Coalition to win three seats, Labor two
and the Greens one.

He believed South Australia was the hardest state to predict.

Green believed the most likely outcome would see the Coalition win three seats, Labor
two and either the Greens, the Democrats or Family First would win the final place. In
Tasmania Green predicted the Liberals would win two seats, Labor three and the Greens
one. In the ACT and the Northern Territory Green predicted the major parties would
each win one seat. However, he believed the Greens had a chance of winning a seat in
the ACT if they could keep the Liberal vote below the 33.3 percent quota and ifthe
Green vote was higher than Labor's surplus above 33.3 percent (Green, 2004).
The Poll Bludger12 (n.d.) also predicted the Greens would perform strongly in the
Senate. The Poll Bludger predicted the Coalition would win 19 seats, Labor 14, the
Greens 5 and the Democrats and Family First would each win I seat. In NSW, Victoria,
Queensland and Western Australia, the Coalition was expected to win three seats, Labor
two and the Greens one. In South Australia the Poll Bludger predicted the Coalition
would win three seats, Labor two and the Democrats one.
Coalition and Labor

w~re

In Tasmania both the

expected to win two seats with the Greens and Family First

each winning one. While the Greens were polling strongly in the ACT the Coalition
and Labor were expected to win one seat each in the ACT and Northern Territory (The

12

The Poll Bludger is a website that provides information about Australian politics. This information was
accessed at http://www.pollbludger.com/sen2004.htm [2005, January 3].
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Poll Bludger, n.d. ).

Therefore, the Comrnentariat held great expectations that the

Greens would perfonn strongly at the 2004 election and would most likely share the
balance of power in the Senate with the Democrats.

The Greens Aim Too High
At the start of the election campaign the Greens themselves were confident of winning
four to seven Senate seats (Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.403). Party leader Bob Brown
expected the Greens to win close to one million votes (Bennett, Newman & Kopras,
2005, p.lO) and secure 8 to 10 percent ofthe national Senate vote (Dodson, 2004).
Brown was confident of winning 3 to 4 Senate seats but believed the Greens had a
strong chance of winning seats in evety state and the ACT (Greens to pick up four seats,
says Brown, 2004; Channel Nine's Sunday, 5 September 2004b).

I think Christine Milne will pick up a seat in Tasmania. David Ristrom in
Victoria- he's a Melbourne City cmmcillor. And John Kay in New South
Wales. Rachel Siewert in Western Australia, and our candidates Drew Hutton in
Brisbane and Brian Noonan in South Australia, they've all got good chances.
... and of course ... Kerry Tucker in the ACT- put a line through the middle of
that, and if we pick up three seats we'll be going extremely well, party status,
and we'll be a vezy fonnidable and responsible Senate component, sharing the
balance of power with the DemocratL.. (Bob Brown interviewed on Channel
Nine's Sunday, 5 September 2004b).
The Greens' Senate candidate for Tasmania, Christine Milne, was also optimistic.
Milne expected the Greens to have a candidate elected in evety state and possibly the
ACT (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004 ). She believed the 2004 federal election would be
'the Green election' (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; Denholm, 2004).

This is going to be the Green election. Spring is here and the country is turning
green (Christine Milne, cited in De11J10lm, 2004).
At the beginning of the campaign- The Australian and the ABC reported that the Greens
could win seats in the House of Representatives and determine which of the major
parties governed in the event of a hung parliament (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004; ABC
Radio AM, 9 September 2004). The Greens' leadership was confident of winning the
seats of Sydney and Melbourne and retaining the seat of Cunningham (Channel Nine's
Sunday, 5 September 2004b; Nettle, 2004 ). It was also considered possible that the
Greens could win the New South Wales' seat of Grayndler (Bacheiard & Denholm,
11

2004). Lindsay Tanner, the Labor member for Melbourne, considered the Greens his
real opposition.

At the 2001 election the Greens gave Tanner a few nervous moments (Economou, 2002,
p .1 ). They polled 16 percent of the primary vote in the seat of Melbourne but after the
distribution of preferences the Greens were only 3.5 percent behind the Liberal
candidate. Because of the tendency of the major parties to preference each other last, if
the Greens had finished ahead of the Liberal candidate they would have won the seat
ahead of Labor with Liberal preferences.

This scenario further contributed to

speculation that the seats of Sydney and Grayndler could be won by the Greens
(Bachelard & Denholm, 2004 ).

The idea of winning seats in the House of

Representatives led Brown to raise the possibility of an accord with the major parties in
the event of a hung parliament (ABC Radio AM, 9 September 2004; The 7.30 Report, 8
September 2004b). It can be seen that Commentariat and Green party expectations were
very high.

2004 Election Results: Disappointment
In keeping with opinion polling prior to the election, the Greens' vote increased at the
2004 federal election. Nationally the Greens' House of Representatives primary vote
increased 2.2 percent to 7.2 percent. 13 Whereas at the 2001 election the Greens polled
10 percent or more of the primary vote in eight electorates, in 2004 they polll 0 percent
or more in 27 electorates, a more than threefold increase (Economou, 2002, p.l; AEC,
2005a, pp.B0-206). 14

However, despite polling strongly in the seats of Sydney

(21.6%), Grayndler (21.1 %), Cunningham (20.1 %) and Melbourne (19.0%), the Greens
did not win election to the House of Representatives and their only sitting member,
Michael Organ, lost his seat of Cunningham (ARC, 2005a, p.B0-206).

Greens'

preferences for the House of Representatives had little impact on the election result.
Out of the sixty-one seats that were decided on preferences, Greens' preferences helped
Labor candidates over the line in twenty-nine seats (AEC, 2005a, ppl30-206; AEC,
2005b). Greens' preferences contributed to the defeat of sitting members in just three
seats, Adelaide, Parramatta and Richmond (AEC, 2005a, pp130-206; Bennett, Newman
& Kopras, 2005, p.40).

13

See Appendix C.
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The Greens performed better in the Senate. Nationally the Greens' Senate primary vote
increased 3.3 percent to 7. 7 percent. is This increase is made more significant given that
at both the 2001 and 2004 elections the Greens contested all 150 House of
Representatives seats, yet it was their Senate vote that grew more substantially. The
Greens primary vote was 16.4 percent in the ACT, 13.3 percent in Tasmania, 8.8
percent in Victoria, 8.1 percent in Western Australia, 7.6 percent in the Northern
Territory and 7.3 percent in NSW.

The Greens did not perform as well in South

Australia (6.6 percent) and Queensland (5.4 percent) (AEC, 2004a, p.120-2). On the
back of their Senate performance, however, the Greens only had two candidates elected,
Christine Milne in Tasmania and Rachel Siewert in Western Australia, bringing their
total number of Senators to four. Despite doubling their numbers in the Senate they fell
short of the predicted four to seven Senate seats and the five seats required to secure
funding and staffing allocations attached to parliamentary party status.

A comparison between opllllon polling on the Greens during the 2004 election
campaign and the Democrats' Senate results in 1998 and 200 I suggests that predictions
that the Greens could win five to seven Senate seats were always unlikely.

The

disparity in opinion polls should have caused the Commentariat to be more cautious in
their predictions. Even though one poll indicated support for the Greens in the Senate
as high as 12 percent, the Greens have historically polled the same in the Senate as the
House of Representatives. Therefore, predictions should have been based on the Greens
securing 7 to 9 percent of the vote. In the 1998 and 2001 elections the Democrats
secured between 7 and 9 percent of the Senate vote and won only four seats. In 1998
the Democrats secured 8.5 percent of the national Senate vote and won four seats. In
2001 the Democrats averaged 7.2 percent of the Senate primary vote and again won
only four seats (Newman, 2005, pp.53-4). It foliows that a prediction that the Greens
could have won four seats was more plausible and that expectations were too high.

Claims by the Greens that they could win seats in the House of Representatives were
unrealistic. Beside the National Party and a small number of Independent candidates,
minor parties have historically been unsuccessful at winning election to the House of
Representatives. Even high profile minor party candidates have failed to be elected to
.the House of Representatives. At the 1990 federal election former Australian Democrat
14
15

See Appendix C. I.
See Appen(,iix D.
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leader Janine Haines contested the South Australian seat of Kingston. Despite receiving
considerable media coverage and winning 24.4 percent of the primary vote, she failed to
be elected. Also in 1990 high profile anti-nuclear campaigner Helen Caldicott contested
the NSW seat ofRichmond. Despite securing 23.3 percent ofthe vote she also failed to

win the seat (Bennett, 1999, p.ll).

In the 1998 election a number of One Nation

candidates won over 20 percent of the primary vote but failed to be elected. Most
notably Pauline Hanson won 36.0 percent ofthe vote in the Queensland seat ofBlair but
failed to win the seat because both major parties preferenced against her (AEC, 1999).
In 1998 the Democrats' John Schumann won 22.4 percent of the vote in the South
Australian seat of Mayo, but also failed to receive enough preferences to win (Bennett,
1999, p.ll). Winning seats in the House of Representatives is very difficult for minor
parties without geographically based support.

Conchtsion
In the lead up to the 2004 federal election the Greens appeared poised to become the
third parliamentary force in Australian politics.

The collapse in support for the

Democrats due to internal leadership tensions and public dissatisfaction with the major
parties over their positions on asylum seekers and the Iraq war fed support for the
Greens. At the start of the 2004 campaign, opinion polls, the Commentariat and the
Greens' leadership fuelled expectations that the Greens would perform strongly.
Opinion polls showed the Greens polling between 6 and 10 percent with one poll
putting their Senate vote at 12 percent. The Commentariat predicted the Greens could
win four to seven Senate seats while the Greens' leadership were confident of winning
up to seven Senate seats and even entering the House of Representatives. The Greens,
however, fell well short of these expectations. They only won two additional Senate
seats and failed to break into the House of Representatives. An analysis of minor party
election results in the Senate and House of Representatives indicates that the Greens had
greater scope to perform better than they actually did in the Senate but expectations of
entering the House of Representatives were a bridge too far. Chapter Three outlines
'constraints theory' as a theoretical framework for explaining why the Greens under
performed at the 2004 federal election.
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CHAPTER3
'CONSTRAINTS THEORY' AND MINOR PARTIES

Minor parties have a poor record of having candidates elected to Australian parliaments.
Between 1910 and 1996 523 minor parties formed in Australia (Jaensch & Mathies(m,
1998, p.26). During the same time, 387 minor parties contested at least one election and
251 minor party candidates were elected to state, territory or federal legislatures
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.209). 'Constraints theory' contends that institutional,
political and internal factors constrain the electoral success 16 of minor parties (Jaensch
and Mathieson, 1998, p.l73 ). Institutional factors include the electoral system and the
two party system. Political factors include the behaviour of major parties, economic
conditions, whether a minor party has geographically based support and the media.
Internal factors encompass the profile and popularity of a party's leader, finances and
resources, a party's ideological position, policy focus and a party's level of experienc'e.
While institutional and political factors can either constrain or facilitate the success of
minor parties the media and internal factors are almost purely detrimental to minor
parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.190). 'Constraints theory' is a convenient term
that refers to Jaensch and Mathieson's (1998, pp.21-3, 173-196) application ofHuass
and Rayside's (1978) theory of party formation to the study ofthe success and failure of
minor parties in Australia.

This Chapter outlines 'constraints theory' as a way of

gaining insight into the Greens' underperformance at the 2004 federal election.

Institutional Constraints
Electoral systems are the most significant constraint on the electoral success of minor
parties (Jaensch and Mathieson, 1998, p.173; Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.97; Bean &
Papadakis, 2005, p.ll1 ). Majoritarian electoral systems are the least beneficial for
minor parties, whereas electoral systems based on proportional representation (PR)
provide the best opportunity for minor parties to gain electoral representation. This is
because PR establishes a much lower threshold for candidates to be elected. Two
electoral systems operate for the Australian Commonwealth Parliament. The House of
Representatives uses majoritarian compulsory preferential voting, also known as the
16

Success for minor parties can be defined more broadlyfuanjust 'electoral success'. Jaensch and
Mathieson's (1998, p.l73) study of minor parties in Australia defmes success in terms of 'longevity of
existence and.breadth of development' as well as 'electoral success'.
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'alternative vote', while the Senate uses a form ofPR known as the 'single transferable
vote' (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.100). The House of Representative has 150 single
member electorates and candidates require 50 percent of the vote plus one vote to be
elected. 17 The high electoral tbJ:eshold effectively bars the election of minor party
candidates other than Coalition partner the National Party. 18 As noted in Chapter Two,
even high profile minor party candidates have failed to secure enough votes to gain
election to the House of Representatives. For instance, at the 2004 federal election
Labor's candidate for the seat of Richmond, Justine Eiiiot, received the lowest primary
vote of any candidate to be elected to the House of Representatives. Eiiiot won 35.6
percent of the primary vote.

In comparison the Greens' candidate for the seat of

Sydney, Jenny Leong, received the highest primary vote of any minor party candidate.
Leong won was just 21.6 percent of first preferences (Australian Electoral Council,
2005, p.). Indeed no minor party candidate has succeeded in being elected to the House
of Representatives at a general election in the post-War period (Papadakis & Bean,
1995, p.l03).

Minor parties have had greater success at being elected to the Senate since PR was
introduced for Senate elections in 1949 (Richmond, 1978, p.322). Sharman (1999,
p.357) notes that the election of minor party candidates was an unintended consequence
of the adoption of PR The major parties believed the original quota of 17 percent was
prohibitive to minor parties. The Country/National Party was the only minor party to
consistently poll over 17 percent. The Senate's electoral system is based on six state
and two territory

multi~member

electorates with PR operating at a state rather than a

national level (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.101). Since the Senate was expanded in
1984 to 76 the states have had twelve representatives and the territories two. For
normal half senate elections candidates require 14.3 percent of the vote. A quota is
calculated as follows (Miragliotta, 1999, p.79; Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.lOI):
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Voters are required to number their ballot paper in preferential order agaiTISt the names of candidates.

.If a candidate fails to be elected on first preferences the candidate with the least number of votes is

eliminated from counting and his or her second preference votes are redistributed among the remaining
candidates. Tnis process is repeated until a candidate gains 50 percent of the vote plus one vote.
l& The National Party's voter identification is geographically based, namely rural constituencies. Most
minor parties, such as the Greens, derive voter identification on an "issues" basis (see Warhurst, 1997).
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Fonnal ballots
Quota= _ _ _ _ _ __

+1

Vacant seats (+1)
A quota is considerably higher in the territories, with candidates requiring 33.3 percent
to be elected after the distribution of preferences. In full Senate elections where all 72
state seats become vacant the quota for election is reduced to just 7. 7 percent in each ·
state jurisdiction. 19 The relatively high Senate electoral threshold has constrained the
number of minor parties that have been able to gain election to the Senate. 20 Most
minor party candidates have needed preferences from other parties to be elected.
Between 1949 and 2004, 76 minor party candidates were elected to the Senate. Only
ten were able to reach a full quota on the strength of their primary vote, and seven of
these occurred at double dissolution elections where the quota was reduced to 7.7
percent (Newman, 2005, pp.34-55; Miragliotta, 1999, p.i7).

The stability of the two party system in Australia creates a limited capacity for minor
parties to enter padiament. While the major parties' share of the primary vote for both
the House of Representatives and Senate has fallen over the past four decades, the vast
majority of Australians still give their first preference to one of the major parties. In the
House of Representatives the major parties secure approximately 80 to 85 percent ofthe
primary vote. In the Senate Australians are more likely to vote for a minor party but the
major parties still secure nearly 80 percent of the primary vote (Bennett, 1999, p.12). In
the Senate, where minor parties have the greatest opportunity of being elected, this
means candidates compete for 15 to 20 percent of the vote. Because minor parties
rarely if ever win more than one of the six available seats they have a limited capacity to
enter parliament. Democrat dominance in Senate elections throughout the 1980s and
90s has meant there has been little opportunity for other minor parties to gain election
let alone achieve the five members required for parliamentary party

sta~s

(Newman,

2005, p46-53).
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Under the Senate's complex preferential system candidates who receive more first preferences than a
quota have their surplus votes transferred to other candidates. This process is repeated until all the quotas
are filled (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.lOl).
20
The Senate quota is relatively high with respect to state upper houses. For exa.T.ple the quota for
el~tion to the NS\V Legislative Coa?}cil is just 4.55 percent, and the quota for election to the Sot.~
Australian Legislative Council is 8.4 percent (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.174-5).

17

Political Constraints
Major party attitudes and behaviour can either facilitate or constrain the electoral
success of minor parties. In keeping with cartel theory (Mair & Katz, 1997) major
parties see minor parties as threats to their hegemony. The major parties have used their
power to entrench their domination ofthe political system (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998,
p.l85). The threat One Nation posed to the major parties' hegemony led to collusion
between the Coalition and Labor to preference One Nation last at the 1998 and 2001
elections.

Tnis helped stifle the development of One Nation and prevented them

entering the parliament despite securing a strong primary vote, particularly in the
Senate21 (Newman, 2005, pp.53-4). According to Mayer (1980, pp.354-5) the major
parties have a range of 'weapons' at their disposal to stit1e the success of minor parties
and protect their hegemony. They can 'strangle publicity' and 'smear and ridicule'
minor parties. They can also 'buy off party leaders, poach key staff and alter electoral
laws. Tony Abbott, a senior mini~ter in the Howard government, went to extraordinary
lengths to destroy One Nation. Abbott established the Australians for Honest Politics
Trust to covertly pursue and destroy One Nation in the courts (Kingston, 2004, p.315-

7). There are cases, however, ofthe major parties assisting some minor parties in order
to further their own electoral interests. This is particularly seen in the relationship
between the Liberal and National parties, but was also seen between the Liberal Party
and the Democratic Labor Party in the 1960s (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.184).

The trend of the major parties to 'catch-all' parties (Kircheimmer, 1996) has been
beneficial for minor parties.

The move toward the centre and the shedding of

controversial and potentially divisive policies by the major parties has resulted in a
proliferation of minor parties to fill the poiitical vacuum. Single-issue parties based on
morals, racism or post-materialism have formed because of this tendency. The battle
over the political centre by the major parties has fostered the popular view that there is
little difterence between the Labor and Liberal parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998,
p.184). They have been referred to as tweedle dee and tweedle dumb ("Minor parties",
n.d.). Many minor parties have formed because the major parties have not fonnulated
specific policies on issues of considerable importance to minority groups or because
their policies have been unacceptable to them. The bipartisan approach by the major
parties to the issues of immigration and multiculturalism has resulted in the formation of
21

One Nation's Len Harris was able to win a Senate seat in Queensland at the 1998 federal election
because he was able to reach a quota on the strength ofhis primary vote (Newman, 2005, p.53).
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a number of race based minor parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.184).

For

instance, the convergence of the major parties over .immigration issues and the
economic rationalist agenda throughout the 1980s and 90s faciiitated the emergence of
One Nation (Beresford & Phii1ips, 1999, pp.34-5). The failure of major parties to form
poiicies on other issues such as abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia has also
motivated the formation of parties concerned with these issues. Major parties, however,
may appropriate minor party policies in order to cut off a minor party's potential.
Wnere such concerns are not adopted by major parties 'the narrowness of a minor
party's appeal may doom it to insignificance' (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp.184-5).

Economic conditions can have a negative or positive impact on minor parties. Under
economic conditions where there is high unemployment and increasing inflation an
increase in political dissent and support for alternative political parties can occur.
According to Richmond (1978, p.325) economic problems in the 1890s led to an
increase in sympathy for the Henry George movement and the 1930s depression saw the
rise of Social Credit parties. The high unemployment and inflation rates in the post1974 period under the Whitlam government saw the formation of the Workers Party.
Conversely, periods of strong economic growth have been associated with a lower level
of minor party involvement in the political system. The Menzies era from 1949 to
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was a period of economic prosperity that saw a low level of minor party involvement
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, pp.185-6). Periods of economic growth may lead to
satisfaction with the government and override other social and political concerns.

It may be that the voters in such a period of economic health may be so satisfied

that other social and political issues are not of sufficient concern for them to
offer support to minor parties, they wiil be happy with the major parties, and
especially the government (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.186).
Minor parties also need a large geographically concentrated sectional base (Jaensch &
Mathieson, 1998, p.l82; Bean & Papadakis, 1995, p.lll; "Minor parties", n.d.). As
mentioned the National Party is the best example of an Australian minor party that has
achieved relative success by having a large concentrated support base. Rural voters
formed the National Party to represent rural interests. Historically the National Party
has enjoyed a relatively high level of electoral support from rural voters (Jaensch &
'Mathieson, 1998, p.182). For instance, at the 1990 federal election the National Party
won just 8.4 percent of the nationwide House of Representatives vote while the
19

Democrats won 11.3 percent.

Despite winning a lower nationwide vote than the

Democrats the National Party won fourteen seats in the House of Representative while
the Democrats won none. In 1993 the National Party's vote dropped to 7.3 percent but
the number of seats they won increased to sixteen (Papadakis & Bean, 1995, p.102).
However, appealing to a clear sectional base is not sufficient for a minor party to be
successful. Other minor parties have formed to represent other sectional interests but
have been unsuccessful. Some of these have appealed to Aborigines, the grey vote,
women and ethnic groups. Wirile the Democratic Labor Party was relatively successful
at winning Senate seats in the 1950s and 60s they were less successful at attracting the
Catholic vote (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l83).

However, until recently the Democrats have been relatively successful despite not
having a distinct sectional base (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l83). Not having a clear
base has allowed the Democrats to appeal across the political spectnun, especialiy to
voters who have become disaftected with the major parties. However, a problem for the
Democrats has been the volatility in their support. Up to 50 percent of the Democrat
vote is replaced from election to election. The fragility of Democrat support means that
they face oblivion if they perfonn poorly at two consecutive elections (Van Onselen,
n.d., p.2).

The Democrats emerged as a 'protest' party, offering an alternative for voters
seeking something other than Labor or Liberal, and as a 'haven' party for those
who, under 'compulsory voting', need a party to vote for. But, as the three
elections in 1990, 1993 and 1996 showed, this 'protest/haven' base is very
fragile (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.183).
The media pose a significant barrier to minor parties. The media focus on the major
parties because they form the government and the alternative government. Table 2
shows the results of a content analysis of the coverage of major and minor parties in two
Australian newspapers during the 2004 federal election campaign period. 75 percent of
the coverage was devoted to the major parties, 8 percent to minor parties and
independents and 17 percent to other content.

Media coverage generates legitimacy

and name recognition for minor parties (Miragliotta, 1999, p.l2). However, 'big party
chauvinism' dominates most of the media. The DLP, for example, believed 'the media
were the main reason for their decline because they were never able to get their message
to the public' (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p. 190). The Australian Greens have also
complained about the difficulty of getting media attention. When representatives of
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state and territory Green parties held a press conference on 30 August 1992 to announce
the founding of the Australian Greens, not one television news crew turned up. Instead
they were covering the opening of the Sydney Harbour Tunnel (Brown & Singer, 1996,
p.85). While political advertising is perhaps the best means parties have to persuade
voters, the cost of advertising puts a significant amount of it out of reach of minor
parties (Young, 2002, p.81). In order to be electorally successful minor parties need
regular media coverage and they have no guarantee of getting it.

Minor parties have no sanctions against media enabling them to gain regular
access which is vital. If they are 'extreme' and make a shock-public-afiairs
stocy, they may gain some freak time. It is imperative [for minor parties] to get
known fast- and that means lots ofregular·exposure on TV close to elections.
[They have] no way of achieving this (Mayer, 1980, p. 351).
Table 2

Coverage of Major and Minor Parties in The Australian and The West Austraiian
Newspapers During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period (30 August to 9
October 2004/2
Newspapers

Major Parties Minor Parties/ Other Total
Independents

The Australian

859

80

222

1161

The West Australian

393

47

73

513

1252

127

295

1674

Total

Internal Constraints
The profile and popularity of a minor party's leader is an important internal factor for
the success of minor parties. Having a popular and well know leader is a vital asset for
the success of minor parties. High profile leaders are more readily able to attract media
attention which allows them to sell their party's message to the voting public.
Leadership has been an important factor in the electoral success of the Democrats
(Bean, 1997, p.86; Forrest, 1995, p.579). Since the party was founded the Democrats
have had high profile and popular national leaders (Bean, 1997, p.83). For example,
22

This table refers to the total coverage of federal politics including opinion pieces. Classification is
based on a story's main focus. Major parties refer to the Liberal!National Coalition and the Labor Party.
Stories on the major parties focused on the leaders, the leaders' wives, policy and major party candidates.
Stories classified as 'other' include reports and opinion pieces on interest groups, polling, data provided
by the Australian Electoral Commission and reports that did not fit into the Major party, Minor
party/Indepen~ent category (e.g. stories on 'celebrity politicians').
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Democrat founder Don Chipp attracted considerable media attention because he was a
former Liberal government minister and because of his 'quirky' personality (Van
Onselen, n.d.). The election of Bob Brown to the Senate in 1996 helped the rise of the
Australian Greens as a result of having an outspoken leader at the national level
(Lohrey, 2002, p.63). Strong personalities frequently dominate minor parties. It is
often the efforts of one or two people that get an emerging minor party off the ground.
This is seen in the founding of the Greens with the work of Drew Hutton and Bob
Brown (Brown & Singer, 1996, p.84; Hutton & Connors, 1999, p.227). Indeed some
minor parties are little more than their founders. Such 'personaiity parties' are usually
only viable while their leaders are involved in the party. It is usually the case that if the
leader leaves the party or has a 'fall from grace' the party will inevitably collapse
(Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l94).

Finance is a further internal constraint on minor parties (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998,
p.l94; ABC Radio Perth, Mornings, 28 June 2005). Even with the introduction of
public funding major parties have still experienced serious financial pressures (Jaensch
& Mathieson, 1998, p.194). Financial pressures are magnified for minor parties by

having to compete in elections with fewer members and staff and far fewer resources.
Minor parties with far [less] members and few backers than major parties, face
even greater financial problems in either keeping full-time staff or in conducting
an election campaign (Henderson, 1985, p.259 cited by Jaensch & Mathieson,
1998, pp.194-5).
While minor parties receive significant staffing and funding entitlements when they
gain five parliamentary seats :fuw minor parties have been able to achieve this. The
Democrats were able to cement their position in pariiament by achieving parliamentary
party status and receiving the additional resources. Staffing entitlements enable minor
parties to get across the detail of legislation and project an aura of competence to the
broader public. Minor parties that appeal to a clear support base also have a greater
ability to raise funding. The Family First Party, which competed at the federal level for
the first time in 2004, was able to wage a million doliar advertising campaign because
of its support from the Assembiies of God Churches (MacLean & Sinclair, 2004 ).

·The narrow ideological and policy tocus of most minor parties is detrimental to their
electoral success (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.l91). While maintaining a narrow
22

ideological and policy focus will retain the support of party members, it is unlikely to
expand a party's membership and make a party electorally competitive. When a minor
party seeks to expand its policy focus to attract new members it is likely to lose its
traditional supporters, who were drawn to the party because of its specific policy focus.
In order for such a party to increase its support it needs to either convince more voters
to support its narrow policy agenda (something that is difficult due to limited resources)
or broaden its- policy framework in an effort to attract more voters. Few parties have
been successful at achieving either (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998, p.191). Where parties
have attempted to expand it has usually led to party fragmentation.

In the 1980s

differences between the left and environmentalists around Australia hindered the
development of a national Green party. The left were opposed to the name 'Green'
because it narrowed the public profile of the party. On the other hand environmentalists
in NSW and Tasmania would not join if 'Green' were left out of the name.

A

compromise led to the creation of the Rainbow Alliance, but disinterest towards it by
the mainstream environment movement and the left meant that it failed to become a
serious alternative voice (Hutton & Connors, 1999, p.228).

A minor party's ideological position may also act as a constraint. Doctrinal parties on
both the extreme left and the extreme right make up a significant proportion of
Austraiia's minor parties. Some minor parties have formed because of policy changes
by major parties, while others have formed because of a perception that the major
parties have not addressed a key component of policy-making. A number of minor
parties emerged in the 1970s following the rejection of the White Australia Policy by
the Whittam government. Moral or Christian parties emerged in the 1970s and 1980s
because they believed <permissiveness' in society had gone too far, and that the major
parties had ignored the 'moral' component of society (Jaensch & Mathieson, 1998,
p.l94 ). The extreme nature of some of these parties means that they are unlikely to
achieve significant public support and thus electoral success. Where parties do achieve
significant public support, as in the case of One Nation, the major parties may move to
incorporate, at least in part, the party's poiicy agenda. In the lead up to the 200 I federal
election the Coaiition appropriated much of One Nation's policy on asylum seekers
(Marr & Wilkinson, 2003, p.45-7, 93). Alternatively they may choose to shut the minor
party out of preference arrangements.
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Jaensch and Mathieson (1998, pp.l91-5) neglect lack of experience as a potential
constraint to the success of minor parties. The lack of knowledge of the political system
may lead to the development of poor party strategy. In 1998 high profile One Nation
leader Pauline Hanson failed in her bid to win election to the House of Representatives
for the Queensland seat of Blair. It is generally considered that if Hanson had run for
the Senate instead of the House she would have been elected and One Nation may have
grown rather than disintegrated (H. Phillips, personal communication, 15 October,
2003; P. Van Onselen, personal communication, 15 December, 2004). mis strategic
decision, however, is only one of the factors that contributed to the decline of One
Nation.

Conclusion
'Constraints theory' provides a theoretical framework for explaining the Greens'
underperformance at the 2004 federal election.

'Constraints theory' contends that

institutional, political and internal party factors can hinder the electoral success of minor
parties.

Institutional constraints include the electoral systems for the House of

Representatives and the Senate and the stability of Australia's two party system. The
electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and Senate are relatively high for
the admission of minor party candidates. While minor parties have been much more
successful at being elected to the Senate they are constrained by their dependence on
preferences. Among the political constraints on minor parties is the hegemonic drive of
major parties, economic conditions, whether a minor party has a geographically
concentrated sectional base and the media. Internal party constraints encompass a
minor party's leader, resources and funding, ideological and policy positions and
experience.

The following Chapter analyses the Greens' performance at the 2004

federal election in relation to 'constraints theory'.
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CHAPTER4

ISSUES, BARRIERS ANn HIAS?

The major constraints on the Greens' perfonnance at the 2004 federal election were the
high electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the

.Greens' relatively low election results. While Greens' leader Bob Brown and Greens'
supporters have claimed that attacks on the Greens, particularly by the government and
sections of the media, cost them votes and seats in parliament (Brown, 2005; Saliba,
2005), the available evidence does not support such claims.

Opinion polling and

Australian Election Study (AES) data suggest the attacks on the Greens had little if any
impact on the Greens' election results. Following the first week of the campaign, when
attacks on the Greens were most pronounced, opinion polls showed an increase in
support for the Greens (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004; Roy Morgan
Research, 2003a).

W1rile AES data show public dislike for the Greens increased

between the 2001 and 2004 elections it was insufficient to cost them seats in parliament.
Newspoll, AC Nielsen and Morgan poll indicate that the terrorist bombing of the
Australian Embassy in Jakarta during the election campaign had the most detrimental
impact on the Greens' vote. However, even if the Greens had not lost support as a
consequence of the bombing they still would not have been able to sunnount the
institutional barriers that constrained their parliamentary result.

Institutional Barriers
The electoral system and the stability of the two party system posed the greatest
constraints on Greens' candidates being elected to the House of Representatives. In the
four House of Representatives seats where the Greens believed they had the strongest
chances ofbeing elected their primary votes were too low. Despite polling just over 20
percent of the primary vote in Cunningham, the Greens' Michael Organ was over 8
percent behind Liberal candidate John Larter on first preferences.

Even after the

distribution of preferences Organ was only able to secure 24 percent of the vote before
being excluded (AEC, 2005c).23 In the seat of Sydney, Greens' candidate Jenny Leong
polied 21.6 percent of the primary vote. While the Greens were 7 percent behind the
Liberal candidate, there were insufficient preferences among the other candidates to put
23

See Appendix E.
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the Greens ahead of the Liberals (AEC, 2005d).24 Labor won the seats of Melbourne
and Grayndler on first preferences. In the Seat of Grayndler Greens' candidate Philip
Myers polled 2 I. I percent of the primacy vote and was just 3.2 percent behind Liberal
candidate Stephanie Kokkolis. However, Labor's Anthony Albonese was able to win
on the strength of his primary vote (AEC, 2005e)?

5

In the seat of Melbourne Labor

MHR Lindsay Tanner's fear of losing his seat to the Greens proved to be unfounded.
While the Greens polled 19.0 percent of the primary vote and were 6 percent behind the
Liberals' Jerry Dimitroulis, Tanner won the seat on first preferences (AEC, 2005f)?

6

The relatively high electoral threshold in the Senate coupled with the Greens' low
Senate results in most of the states contributed to the Greens failure to win more Senate
seats. In all states except Tasmania and Western Australia the Greens polled below the
statistical average percentage of the primacy vote minor party candidates have achieved
between 199027 and 2001 when elected to the Senate. In NSW the statistical average for
candidates elected to the Senate between 1990 and 2001 was 8.2 percent of the primary
vote. The Greens, however, only polled 7.3 percent. In Victoria the statistical average
for election was 11.0 percent and the Greens polled 8.8 percent. In Queensland the
mean score for being elected to the Senate was 10.3 percent and the Greens polled just
5.4 percent. The mean score in South Australia was 13.2 percent while the Greens
polled just 6.6 percent of the primacy vote. However, in Western Australia the Greens
won election on 8.1 percent, compared to the mean score of 7.1 percent. Similarly in
Tasmania the Greens' candidate was elected on 13.3 percent compared with the mean
score of 9.6 percent (Newman, 2005, pp.50-4). While polling above the statistical
average is not a sufficient condition for being elected to the Senate, the Greens' 2004
results suggests that candidates that do so have a better chance ofbeing elected.

Because minor parties are rarely able to reach a full quote on the strength of their
primacy vote most depend on preferences to win Senate seats. Miragliotta (1999, p.3)
has shown that innovative minor parties are able to overcome the relatively high
electoral threshold to the Senate by engaging in strategic across house preference deals
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penultimate Senator was elected from each state and in 1987 there was a double dissolution election
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party Senate results.
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with major parties. However, while the Greens entered into preference deals with Labor
at the 2004 election they did not benefit from them. The Greens decided to give their
preferences to Labor in thirty of the most marginal House of Representatives divisions
and in the Senate in return for Labor preferences in the Senate across Australia. Greens'
leader Bob Brown saw the preference deal with Labor as strategicaily important but also
argued that Labor had a better range of policies than the Coalition (ABC TV Lateline,
22 September 2004a). While the Greens entered into a preference agreement with the
Democrats at the start of the election. campaign the Greens' deal with Labor generated
acrimony between the Democrats and the Greens and caused the agreement to be
broken. In retaliation against the Greens' preference deal with Labor the Democrats
entered into a preference deal with Family First (ABC TV Lateline, 20 September
2004b; Crabb & Heinrichs, 2004).
Poor preference flows to the Greens coupled with the high rate of above-the-line voting
contributed to the Greens' poor Senate resuit. The decision by Labor to preference the
Family First Party ahead the Greens in Victoria and Tasmania meant the Greens tailed
to win the final Senate place in Victoria and struggled to win the final place in
Tasmania. Voting above the line gives parties greater power to determine where votes
go (Miragliotta, 1999, p.92).

Despite winning 8.8 percent of first preferences in

Victoria the Greens lost the final seat to Family First, who received just 1.9 percent of
first preferences (AECa, 2004, p.l20). Underlying Family First's success were their
preference deals with the Democrats and Labor. Preferences from various 'microparties' pusQ.ed Family First ahead ofthe Democrats whose preferences, and Labor's
poor result, put Family First ahead of Labor's third candidate, Senator Jacinta Collins.
Labor's preferences ensured Family First finished ahead of the Greens to win the final
Senate seat in Victoria (The Poll Bludger, n.d.).

In Tasmania Greens' Senate candidate Christine Milne received 13.3 percent of the
primary vote, just one percent below a full quota.

Despite Brown prematurely

announcing Milne's victory early on election night, she only narrowly won the last
Senate spot.

The crucial factors in the Greens victory were the low number of

candidates and the high rate, almost 20 percent, of below-the-line votes (The Poll
Bludger, n.d. ). Tasmania has had a comparatively lower level of above-the-line votes
since the introduction of above-the-line voting for Senate elections in the early 1980s
(Miragliotta, 1999, p.92). Because preferences from below-the-line votes favoured the
27

Greens, Milne was able to win the final Senate place. If more Tasmanians voted above
the line instead of below it, then it is most likely Family First's Jacquie Petrusma would
have won the last Tasmania Senate seat (The Poii Bludger, n.d.).

In contrast, in Western Australia the Greens were able to win the final Senate spot
because of preference flows from Labor and the Democrats. Unlike in Victoria and
Tasmania Labor placed the Greens second on their Western Australian voting ticket.
While the Democrats also put Family First ahead of the Greens in Western Australia,28
Family First's very low primary vote meant they were excluded from the Senate count
before the Democrats, which ensured Democrat preferences flowed to the Greens (ABC,
n.d.; ABC, 2004b ). The Greens were able to reach a full quota by receiving Democrats'
preferences, 0.14 of a quota, and Labor surplus votes, 0.28 of a quota (The Poll Bludger,
n.d. ). Democrat preferences were crucial to the Greens' failure to win a Senate in New
South Wales.

The Democrats preferenced Fred Nile's Christian Democratic Party

ahead of the Greens. The elimination of Liberals for Forests' candidate Glenn Druery
~

in the final rounds of counting pushed Fred Nile ahead of both Labor and the Greens.
Because the Greens had fallen behind Labor Greens preferences meant that Labor won
the final seat (The Poll Bludger, n.d.).

While luck was the most significant factor in the outcome of the Queensland Senate
race, the Greens did not poll strongly enough in South Australia. The Coalition was
ultimately able to win four Senate seats in Queensland because the Liberal party and the
Nationals ran on a split ticket. If the Liberals and Nationals had of run on a joint ticket,
as the Nationals had been agitating, it would have been impossible for the Coalition to
win a fourth seat and either the Greens or One Nation would have won the final Senate
place (The Poll Bludger, n.d.; Bennett, Newman & Kropas, 2005, p.30). In South
Australia Family First won 4.0 percent of first preferences and finished ahead of the
Democrats. Democrat preferences flowed to Family First which pushed them ahead of
the Greens. Tins locked up the preferences the Greens needed with Family First and
ensured the elinllnation of the Greens in the final rounds of counting. However, even if
the Democrats had finished ahead of Family First, preferences from Family First and
then the Liberals would have given the final seat to the Democrats ahead of the Greens
(The Poll Bludger, n.d.).

28

The Greens Under Attack
Everyone Vs the Greens
Throughout the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens came under sustained attack
from a number of political parties and interest groups.

~Gonsistent

with 'constraints

theory' the government's attacks on the Greens represented the hegemonic drive ofthe
major parties to protect their position and power. f' With opinion polls showing the
Coaiition weil ahead on primary votes and Labor either neck and neck or ahead on the
two party preferred vote, the government feared that Greens' preferences could deliver
government to Labor. The government's policies on asylum seekers and Iraq led it to
fear losing disaffected small '1' Liberal voters to the Greens (Middleton, 2004b). The
government engaged in a scare campaign, utilising what Mayer (1980, p.355) calls the
'weapon of smear and ridicule', against the Greens in order to stop a leakage of votes to
Labor (Middleton, 2004f). On tlie first day of the campaign Prime Minister Howard
told the media the government would draw attention to the Greens' policies to
discourage traditional Liberal voters from voting for the Greens (Coleman, 2004b ).

As part of the government's scare campaign against the Greens a number of senior
ministers and Liberal party officials attacked the Greens. On the first day of the election
campaign the Prime Minister attacked the Greens for what he referred to as their
"kooky" policies (Bennett, Newman & Kropas, 2005, p.27). Treasurer Peter Costello
warned voters that the Greens had both a 'soft' and a 'hard' edge. The Greens had a
soft image in relation to trees and the environment but a hard edge in relation to their
policies on 'legalising hard dnigs such as ecstasy andre-implementing death duties and
increasing company tax' (Channel 10 Meet the Press, 5 September 2004b). Deputy
Prime :Nfinister John Anderson went further by engaging in ad hmninem attacks on the
Greens and their supporters. Anderson labelled the Greens 'watermelons' asserting that
they were 'green on the outside and red on the inside' and that they were a 'home for
people who in the 1950s would have joined the Cotmnunist Party' (Bennett, Newman &
Kropas, 2005, p.27). In a further attempt to highlight the Greens' extremism, Anderson
relabelled the Greens 'avocados: hard green outside, soft and mushy inside with a big
brown nut in the middle' (Avocado? Melon? A fruitcake? 2004). The state director of
'the Victorian Liberal Party, Julian Sheezel, also attacked the Greens:
28
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The Greens are social and economic radicals first, enviromnentalist
second ... They want to limit us from having family barbecues but they [also]
want to allow our kids to use dope freeiy (cited by Bennett, Newman & Kropas,
2005, p.27).
The government also used letterbox drops and advertising to warn voters against voting
for the Greens. Part of the Coalition's scare campaign against the Greens incorporated
letterbox drops in areas of high Greens' support. The Coalition's bright green A3-sized
flyers warned voters about Greens' policies, especially in relation to drugs (Marriner,
2004 ). In the final days of the campaign Liberal Party newspaper advertising warned
voters about 'The Greens- Labor Dear:

Fact 1: The Labor/Greens preference deal could hand government to Labor
Fact 2: The Greens proposed "loopy laws" could get support form Labor and be
passed.
Advice: if you don't want Labor to get into government through a Labor/Greens
preference deal, then give your first or second preference vote to the Liberals. 29
The Greens came under attack from a range of other sources. Although Labor courted
Greens' preferences, Lindsay Tanner, the Labor member for Melbourne, labelled the
Greens 'mad' and an anonymous Labor 'operative' called the Greens 'flaky, kooky,
wacky, loopy and irresponsible' (Bachelard & Denholm, 2004).

Democrat leader

Andrew Bartlett criticised the Greens over their consistent support of Labor in the
Senate in order to pmtray the Democrats as truly independent and therefore the real
alternative to the major parties (Guerrara, 2004; Middleton, 2004a). The Family First
Party attacked the Greens because they believed Greens' policies would hurt families
(ABC TV The 7.30 Report, 4 October 2004a). Part of Family First's miliion dollaradvertising budget was devoted to attacking the Greens' drugs policy (MacLean &
Sinclair, 2004 ).

The voiceover on Family First's television advertisement stated,

"Heroin, ecstasy- the Greens want to legalise the lot They're going to give my kids
easy access to marijuana," and exclaimed, "Bob, that's not greens, it's extreme" (ABC
TV The 7.30 Report, 4 October 2004a; Manning & Rootes, 2005, p.404). However,
Family First was forced to withdraw its advertisement after the Greens threatened legal
action (Brown, 2004a; Drug ads irk Greens, 2004 ). The consistent negative publicity
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toward the Greens' drugs policy throughout the campaign forced them defend their
policy with advertising. 30

The Greens were also attacked by a number of interest groups. The Business Council of
Australia condemned the Greens' economic policies. It warned voters the Greens'
increased int1uence in the Senate could undermine economic growth by their policies of
protectionism, barriers to foreign investment, government intervention and higher taxes
(Uren, 2004; Business warns of Green threat, 2004). On the last days ofthe campaign
Timber Communities Australia took out full-page advertisements in the HobartMercury
and the Launceston Examiner entitled 'Recipe for a Green party' attacking the Greens
economic and social policies31 (Bennett, Newman & Kopras, 2005, p.27-8). The Forest
Industries Association of Tasmania warned voters about the influence ofthe Greens on
a Labor govemment. 32 The Australian Meat Industry Employees Union labelled the
Greens a 'small and extremist minority' (Greens 'just extremists', 2004).

Media Bias?
Greens' leader Bob Brown and Greens' supporters have claimed that bias against the
Greens by sections of the media cost the Greens votes and seats in parliament (Brown,
2005; Saliba, 2005). Table 3 provides a summary of the news coverage of the Greens in
Australia's major national and state newspapers during the 2004 federal election
campaign period. The content analysis indicates that the overall coverage of the Greens
was relatively balanced. Out ofthe 176 news reports on the Greens 58 were classified
'unfavourable', 53 'neutral' and 65 'favourable'. Full details of the content analysis are
provided in Appendix H. Wbile The Australian, The Age, The West Australian, The
Advertiser and The Mercury presented relatively balanced coverage, The Sydney
Morning Herald, The Courier Mail and the Herald Sun presented the most unbalanced
coverage. While The Sydney Morning Herald had a ratio of 2 to I favourable to
unfavourable stories it should be noted that many of the reports on the Greens in The
Sydney Morning Heraid were brief articles of less than fifty words.

The content

analysis supports Bob Browns claims that the Herald Sun's reporting on the Greens was
biased. The Herald Sun showed a ratio of3 to 1 unfavourable to favourable stories on
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the Greens. Unlike other newspapers it engaged in the most vituperative attacks on the
Greens.

Favourable reports on the Greens focused on the Greens' campaign launch (Middleton,
2004c; Greens launch, 2004), Bob Brown's address to the National Press Club (Price,
2004 ), Greens' candidates (Saunders, 2004a; Denhohn, 2004 ), and some Greens'
policies (Hayes, 2004a; Hayes, 2004b).

Unfavourable reports focused on Greens'

policies, particularly Greens' drugs policy (Coleman, 2004b; McManus, 2004a;
McManus, 2004b), and government attacks on the Greens (Karvelas, 2004; Rehn,
2004). 33

Table 3
News Coverage ofthe Greens in the Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election
Campaign Pertocf4

Newspaper

Unfavourable

Neutral

Favourable

Total

The Australian

7

'"
lU

9

26

The Sydney Moniliig Herald

5

9

12

26

13

1

4

18

The Age

3

5

7

15

The Courier Mail

5

4

10

19

The West Australian

7

8

8

23

The Advertiser

5

10

3

18

The Mercury

13

6

12

31

Total

58

53

65

176

The Herald Sun

The most noted example ofbias against the Greens appeared in the Herald Sun (Saliba,
2005; Ramsey, 2005). In a report entitled "Greens policy backs illegal drugs" Herald
Sun Report Gerard McManus provided an inaccurate and unbalanced report on the

Greens' drugs policy. The opening paragraph of the report asserted, "Ecstasy and other
illegal drugs would be supplied over the counter to young users in a radical policy
framed by Senator Bob Brown's Greens" (McManus, 2004a). Greens' policy, however,
only sought to find 'alternatives' to current drugs policy (APC, 2005). Following the
.2004 election Greens' leader Bob Brown made a formal complaint about the Herald
33
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Sun story to the Australian Press Council (APC) (Saliba, 2005; Ramsey, 2005). The
APC's (2005) adjudication, handed down on 4 March 2005, found that the infonnation
contained in the report was inaccmate and that it potentialiy damaged the Greens'
electoral support.

In the context of an approaching election, the potential damage was
considerable. The achml electoral impact cannot be known, but readers were
seriously misled (APC, 2005).
Speaking to the Press Council's adjudication Senator Brown stated that the Herald Sun
report was a malicious attempt to damage the Greens.

This manufactmed news, which misled readers of Australia's highest circulation
daily, is a disgrace to the profession ofjournalism.
It perverted democracy. When a joW"nalist misinforms readers on their way to
the ballot box democracy is sacrificed.

This was no accident or mistake. The aim was to attack the Greens, not through
the editorial column, but through the news pages. The outcome of the false
concoction of the Greens policies was to lose om party tens of thousands of
votes and, in my calculation, seats in parliament (Brown, 2005).
Saliba (2005) went further, stating that the wide distribution of the Herald Sun story
cost the Greens 'hundreds-of-thousands of votes' and Senate seats in Victoria,
Queensland and South Australia. As outiined below the available evidence does not
support these claims.

A content analysis of opinion pieces on the Greens dming the federal election campaign
period shows that there were many more negative pieces than positive pieces. Table 4
indicates a strong editorial bias against the Greens. Out of the 29 opinion pieces on the
Greens 21 were negative and 8 were positive, a ratio of2.6 to 1 against the Greens. For
full details of the content analysis see Appendix I.

The Herald Sun, The West

Australian and The Australian had the highest ratio of negative opinion pieces to
positive pieces. Only The Sydney Morning Herald defied the trend with two positive
pieces and one negative opinion piece on the Greens.

'Negative opinion pieces attacked the Greens over their policies and ideology. The
Greens' economic and drugs policies received a particular battering (Pearson, 2004;
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Murray 2004; Ackerman, 2004; Costello, 2004). Russell (2004), for example, asserted
that 'the Greens' economic and tax policies would create a depression that would make
the 1930s iook like an economic boom'. Lapkin (2004) criticised the Greens' defence
policy and Sheridan (2004) attacked the Greens over their opposition to Australia's
alliance with the United States. Ackerman (2004) attacked the Greens for their 'rabid
irrational policies' while Bolt (2004a; 2004b) labelled the Greens' ideology 'toxic' and
implied that they were anti-Semitic.

Positive opinion pieces defended the Greens

against attack (Norman, 2004; Brown, 2004b) and stated that the Greens were about to
enter the mainstream (Pennells, 2004 ).

Table4
Opinion Pieces on the Greens During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period'5
1

Newspaper

I Negative I Positive I Total
£

The Australian

u

The Sydney Monring Herald

f
ol

0

1

21
2l

3

The Herald Sun

4

1

5

The Age

2

1

3

The Courier Mail

1

0

1

The West Australian

4

1

5

The Advertiser

1

1

2

The Mercury

2

0

2

21

8

29

Total

Strong criticism of the Greens was not limited to the opinion pages of Australia's major
newspapers. Prominent radio talkback host, Alan Jones, also savaged the Greens during
the election campaign in an attempt to discourage people from voting for them. On his
opinion slot on Channel Nine's Today show Jones hysterically attacked the Greens. On
31 August Jones drew on McManus' Herald Sun report to attack the Greens over their
drugs policy and a range of other policies. He labelied the Greens <ratbags' and their
supports 'stupid'. He warned voters that if the Greens 'came dose to political power,
Australia would be stufted' (Jones, 2004a). On 30 September, less than a two weeks
out from the election, Jones again devoted his Today show slot to attacking the Greens'
.policies. He warned voters the Greens would, decriminalise hard drugs, cut public
funding to non-government schools, increase the Medicare levy, introduce over forty
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new taxes, including taxes on the family home, and abolish the mandatory detention of
asylum seekers (Jones, 2004b ).

In line with 'constraints theory' the Greens had limited opportunities to defend

themselves and their policies from attack. Although the Greens received greater media
attention than other minor parties it was still insufficient to counter criticism from their
opponents. Out of the 127 stories on minor parties and independents or 8 percent of
total political coverage in The Australian and The West Australian newspapers during
the election campaign, 62 stories or 4 percent of total political coverage focused on the
Greens. 36 Almost 40 percent of these stories were unfavourable to the Greens. The
Greens also had few television interview opportunities on Australia's premiere political
programs. Greens' leader Bob Brown appeared once on Channel Nine's Sunday (5
September 2004b) program and Channel Ten's Meet the Press (3 October 2004a). He
was not interviewed on the main interview slot on the ABC's Insiders. 37 The Greens'
limited advertising budget was insufficient to counter Liberal Party advertisements
attacking the Greens38 (MacLean & Sinclair, 2004; Young, 2002, p.91). Although the
attacks generated some media opportunities for the Greens, they lost control of their
message to voters and had to devote many of their media opportunities to defending
themselves and their policies.

The attacks on the Greens, however, appear to have been counterproductive. The
available evidence suggests that attacks on the Greens by the government, minor parties,
interest groups and sections of the media had little if any detrimental impact on the
Greens' election results. Opinion polling over the campaign period shows that in the
first week of the campaign when attacks on the Greens were most pronounced, rather
than support for the Greens going down it went up. A Newspoll survey conducted over
August 27 to 29, the last poll prior to the government and media attacks, showed the
Greens polling at 6 percent. The next Newspoll survey conducted over September 3 to
5, after the initial government and media attacks, showed the Greens' polling up 2
percent to 8 percent (Newspoll!The Australian, n.d.). A Morgan Poll conducted over
August 14/15 and 21122, showed support for the Greens at 9 percent. Similarly, a
35
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Morgan Poll conducted over August 28/29 and September 4/5, showed support for the
Greens' up 1.5 percent to 10.5 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a). AC Nielsen
showed support for the Greens stable at 9 percent (AC Nielsen, 2004 ). 39

The Australian Election Study (AES) 2001 and 2004 suggests that between the 2001
and 2004 federal elections Australians' increasingly disliked the· Greens and Greens'
leader Bob Brown. Following the 2001 election 29.8 percent of respondents recorded
neutral feelings about the Greens. 33.4 percent indicated that they liked the Greens and
36.9 percent indicated that they disliked the Greens, with a subset of 10.8 percent
indicating a 'strong dishke' for the Greens (AES, 2003a). Following the 2004 election
the number of respondents with neutral feelings about the Greens fell to 21.6 percent.
The number ofrespondents that liked the Greens remained stable at 31.0 percent. The
number of respondent who disliked the Greens increased to 47.2 percent. The largest
increase was among the subset of respondents who 'strongly disliked' the Greens,
which rose 7 percent to 17.8 percent (AES, 2005a). Austrahans' feelings about Bob
Brown similarly changed. The number of respondents who had neutral feeling about
Brown fell from 40.6 percent in 2001 to 28.3 percent in 2004. The number of people
who expressed a 'strong dislike' for Brown increased from 11.3 percent to 19.7 percent
(AES, 2003b; AES, 2005b ).

However, a cross-tabulation of respondents' feelings about the Greens and Bob Brown
with respondents' 'own left-right positions' indicates that the greatest increase in strong
dislike for the Greens was among those on the hard right. While respondents with
centrist views who strongly disliked the Greens increased moderately from 10.6 percent
to 15.7 percent, respondents on the hard right who strongly disliked the Greens
increased substantially from 25.0 percent to 49.2 percent (AES, 2003c; AES, 2005c).
Similarly, while strong dislike for Brown went up moderately among centrists from
11.1 percent to 17.6 percent, it increased significantly among those on the hard right,

from 18.4 percent to 46.8 percent (AES, 2003d; AES, 2005d). The Australian Election
Study does not indicate when or why Australians' feelings about the Greens changed.
However, the data indicate that even if the attacks on the Greens during the 2004
election campaign were responsible for the shift in Austrahans' feelings about them, it
primarily influenced those on the hard right, people who would not have voted for the
Greens anyway (AES, 2005e; AES, 2005t}
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The Australian Embassy Bombing
Until the terrorist attack on the Australian Embassy in Jakarta on 9 September 2004,
toward the end of the second week of the campaign, terrorism and national security
issues were largely at the periphery of the campaign. Except for comments by Richard
Clark, former counter-terrorism advisor to US Presidents Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush (Kerin & Colman, 2004; Middleton, 2004g), and Attorney General Pbiitip
Ruddock's comments on the Beslan school massacre (Benham, 2004; Nicholson &
Shaw, 2004), the threat of terrorism to Australia was mostly excluded from the
campaign. The Embassy bombing, however, thrust national and international security
issues to the centre of the campaign (Middleton, 2004e). Security issues remained
centre stage throughout the third week of the campaign following a hoax announcement
that Iraqi insurgents had taken two Australian contractors hostage and would to execute
them unless Australian forces were withdrawn from Iraq (Allard, 2004; Seccombe &
Allard, 2004 ).

With polling showing the Coalition better able to handle national

security issues (AES, 2005g; AES, 2005h; Middleton, 2004d) the Prime Minister sought
to keep national security and the threat of terrorism on the agenda by restating his preemptive strike doctrine (Ruse & Middleton, 2004; Crabb, 2005, pp251-2; Latham, 2005,
p.342).

While the bombing of the Australian Embassy has been considered in analyses of the
outcome of the election (Bennett, Newman & Kopras, 2005, pp.15-16) it has been
neglected in analyses of the Greens' election performance. The bombing appears to
have caused the greatest drop in support for the Greens.

While multiple factors

influence opinion polls the bombing overshadowed other issue and remained the
dominant issue during the brief campaign hiatus (Moore & Romples, 2004; Mitchell,
Dodson & Moore, 2004; Channel Nine's Sunday, 12 September 2004a). It was also a
dominant theme in the leaders debate on Sunday 12 September. Despite Newspoll and
Morgan Poll showing an increase in support for the Greens at the end of the first week
of campaigning, all three polls showed a drop in Greens' support immediately following
the Embassy bombing. Newspoll showed support tor the Greens drop from 8 percent to
6 percent (NewspollfThe Australian, n.d.). AC Nielsen (2004) showed the Greens'
·support drop from 9 percent to 8 percent. Morgan Poll showed a drop of2.5 percent
from 10.5 percent to 8 percent (Roy Morgan Research, 2003a). All three polls indicate
that the drop in support for the Greens mostly shifted to the Coalition government.
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While Newspoll and Morgan Poll showed slight increases in support for the Greens in
the weeks after the bombing, Greens' support never returned to levels prior to the
bombing (Newspoli/The Austraiian, n.d.; AC Nielsen, 2004, Roy Morgan Research,
2003a). However, even if the Greens had retained the 1 to 1.5 percent they lost in the
polls as a consequence of the bombing, it would have been insufficient to surmount the
institutional barriers that constrained the Greens' election performance.

Conciusion
'Constraints theory' provides an adequate theoretical framework for explaining the
Greens' underperfonnance at the 2004 federal election. The high electoral thresholds in
the House of Representatives and the Senate and the Greens' relatively low election
results were the dominant constraints on the Greens. The Greens' low results made
them dependant on preferences and because they did not receive adequate preference
flows they were unable to win seats. The government's attacks on the Greens represent
the drive by the major parties to maintain their position and power in the Australian
poiitical system.

While the Greens had limited media opportunities to defend

themselves against attack, the available evidence does not support claims that the
attacks cost the Greens votes and seats in parliament. Polling and AES data suggest the
attacks on the Greens had little if any impact on the Greens' election results. Polling
indicates the terrorist bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta during the election
campaign had the most detrimental impact on the Greens' vote. However, even if the
bombing had not occurred the Greens would not have been able to surmount the
institutional factors that constrained their parliamentary result.

Wlrile 'constraints

theory' provides an adequate framework in relation to institutional factors, it does not
explain why the Embassy bombing caused some potential Greens' voters to shift their
support to the government. This suggests that 'constraints theory' could be extended to
include terrorism as a potential political constraint to the electoral success of minor
parties.
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CHAPTERS
THESIS CONCLUSION

In the lead up to the 2004 federal election campaign the Greens appeared poised to
perform strongly. The collapse of the Democrats and disaffection among sections ofthe
public over the major parties' stance on asylum seekers and the Iraq war fed support for
the Greens. By the start of the 2004 election campaign opinion polls, the Commentariat
and the Greens' leadership were fuelling expectations of a strong Greens' election
result. Opinion polls showed support for the Greens running at between 6 and 10
percent and the Commentariat were predicting the Greens could win between four and
seven Senate seats. The Greens' leadership was optimistic of winning Senate seats in
every state and possibly the ACT. It was widely expected that the Greens would share
the balance of power in the Senate with the remaining Democrat Senators. Greens'
leader Bob Brown was also confident of winning seats in the House ofRepresentatives.
Brown even raised the prospect of an accord with the major parties in the event that the
Greens held the balance of power in a hung parliament. The Greens, however, had just
two candidates elected to the Senate, bringing their total to four, and failed to win
election to the House of Representatives. Indeed, the Howard government increased its
majority in the House ofRepresentatives and gained control ofthe Senate, thus denying
the Greens a share of the balance of power.

Chapter Two showed the expectations placed on the Greens were too high, but that the
Greens nevertheless under performed at the 2004 federal election. Expectations that the
Greens would win up to seven Senate seats and enter the House of Representatives were
unrealistic. A comparison of the Greens' polling with the Democrats past Senate results
suggests that the Greens were unlikely to win five to seven Senate seats. A prediction
that the Greens could have won four Senate seats would have been more plausible. But
the Greens even failed to reach this. Expectations that the Greens could win seats in the
House of Representatives were even more unreaiistic. 1he history of minor party
contests for the House of Representatives shows no minor party candidates have been
successful at winning election to the House of Representatives at a general election in
the post-war period. Even high profile minor party candidates have failed to come ciose
to being elected to the House of Representatives.
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Having shown that the Greens under performed in Chapter Two, Chapter Three outlined
'constraints theory' as a theoretical model for explaining why the Greens under
performed.

'Constraints theory' is a convenient term for Jaensch and Mathieson's

(1998) application of Hauss and Rayside's (1978) theory of party formation to the
success and failure of minor parties in Australia. 'Constraints theory' contends that
institutional, political and internal factors hinder the electoral success of minor parties.
Institutional factors included the electoral system and the two party system. Political
factors include the behaviour of the major parties, economic conditions and whether a
minor party has the support of a geographically concentrated base. Internal constraints
encompass a minor party's leader, finances and resources, ideological and policy
positions and political experience.

Chapter Four showed that 'constraints theory' provides an adequate framework for
explaining why the Greens under performed at the 2004 federal election. Wnile the
Greens confronted a range of issues during the 2004 election campaign, institutional
factors provided the dominant constraint on the Greens' election result.

The high

electoral thresholds for the House of Representatives and the Senate, coupled with the
Greens relatively low election results, were the fundamental reasons why the Greens
failed to have more candidates elected to either chamber. In every state, except Western
Australia and Tasmania, the Greens polied below the statistical average of the primary
vote minor party candidates have achieved when elected to the Senate. Because the
Greens were unable to reach a full quota in the Senate they were dependant on other
parties for preferences. While the Greens sought to maximise their electoral chances by
entering into across house preference deals with Labor, strong preference flows against
them meant they faiied to have more candidates elected to the Senate.

Attacks on the Greens and the terrorist bombing ofthe Australian Embassy in Jakarta
were the two major issues the Greens confronted during the 2004 election campaign.
Much has been made of the barrage of attacks on the Greens by the government and
sections of the media.

The Greens, like other minor parties, had limited media

opportunities to defend themselves against the attacks. In line with 'constraints theory'
the government sought to protect its position and power by attacking the Greens in order
to discourage traditional Liberal voters from voting for the Greens. A content analysis
of newspaper reports and opinion pieces (see Appendices H and I) was also presented in
Chapter Four to establish whether there was systematic bias against the Greens during
40

the election campaign.

The content analysis revealed that only the Herald Sun

presented biased news coverage against the Greens. Opinion pieces ran against the
Greens by a ratio of 2.6 to 1. Nevertheless, opinion polling and AES data suggest the
attacks on the Greens had little if any detrimental impact on the Greens' election results.
While opinion polls suggest the Australian Embassy bombing had the greatest
detrimental impact on the Greens' vote, it too was unlikely to have cost the Greens seats

in parliament. While 'constraints theory' provides a wide explanatory framework for
analysing the underperformance of minor parties, it fails to provide insight into why
voters shifted their support from the Greens to the government in the aftermath of the
Australian Embassy bombing. This suggests 'constraints theory' could be extended to
include terrorism as a potential political constraint to the electoral success of minor
parties.

41

REFERENCES

ABC Radio, AM. (2004, September 9). Greens consider accord with major party [online]. Available WWW: http://www.abc.net.au!am/content/2004/sll95341.htm.
[2004, September 10].
ABC Radio Perth, Mornings. (2005, June 28). Interview with Western Australian
Democrats' Senator Andrew Murray.
AC Nielsen. (2004.). 2004 Estimates ojfederal voting intention and leadership
approval [on-line]. Available WWW: www.acnielsen.com.au. [2005, August
1].
AC Nielsen. (2005). 2005 Estimates ojfederal voting intention and leadership
approval [on-line]. Available WWW: www.acnielsen.com.au. [2005, August
1].
Akerman, P. (2004, September 20). If you want to go nowhere... The Mercury, p.21.
Allard, T. (2004, September 14). Australian hostage faces execution. The Sydney
Morning Herald, p.L
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005a). VariableB25GRN: B25. Feelings about
Greens [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstarlight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005b ). VariableCJ BROWN: Cl. Feelings about
Bob Brown [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstarlight/index.isp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005c). B25. Feelings about Greens. BlO. Own lejfright position [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstariight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005d). Cl. Feelings about Bob Brown. Bl 0. Own
lejf-right position [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstarlightiindex.isp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005e). B25. Feelings about Greens. Ell. Vote in
Senate [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstariight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005f). Cl. Feelings about Bob Brown. Ell. Vote
in Senate [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstarlight/index.isp. [2005, September 15].
·Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005g). Ell. Vote in House ofRepresentatives. Dl
Importance of terrorism [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstariight/index.jsp. [2005, September 20].
42

Australian Election Study, 2004. (2005h). Ell. Vote in Senate. Dl. Importance of
terrorism [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.au!nessarlight/index.isp. [2005, September 20].
Austraiian Election Study, 2001. (2003a). VariableB25GRN: B25. Feelings about
Greens [on-line]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.au/nesstarlight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2001. (2003b). VariableCJBROWN· Cl. Feelings about
Bob Brown [online]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.aulnesstarlight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2001. (2003c). B25. Feelings about Greens. BJO. Own leftright position [online]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.auinesstarlight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Election Study, 2001. (2003d). Cl. Feelings about Bob Brown. BJO. Own
left-right position [online]. Available WWW: http://assda224100.anu.edu.auinesstarlight/index.jsp. [2005, September 15].
Australian Eiectoral Commission .. (2005a). Electoral pocketbook. Includes 2004
federal election results. Commonwealth of Australia.
Australian Electoral Commission. (2005b ). Seats decided on preferences [on-line].
Available WWW:
http://results.aec. gov. au/12246/results/HouseSeatsDecidedOnPrefs-12246NAT.htm. [2005, October 10].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2005c). Distribution a/preferences NSW division Cunningham [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au. [2005,
September 10].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2005d). Distribution ofpreferences NSW division Sydney [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au. [2005, September
10].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2005e). Distribution a/preferences NSW divisionGrayndler [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au. [2005,
September 10].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2005f). Distribution ofprejerences Victorian
division -Melbourne [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au.
[2005, September 10].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2004a). Behind the scenes: the 2004 election
results [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au. [2005, July 1].
Australian Electoral Commission. (2004b ). Senate group voting tickets. Western
Australia [on-line]. Available WWW: http://www.aec.gov.au. [2005,
September 10].
Australian Electoral Commission [CD-Rom]. (1999). Election statistics 1993, 1996,
43

1998. Commonwealth of Australia.
Australian Electoral Commission. (n.d.). Senate state distribution ofprejerences, WA.
[Available by request from the Australian Electoral Commission].
Austraiian Press Council. (2005 ). Adjudication no. 1270 (adjudicated February 2005)
[on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.presscouncil.org.au!pcsite/adj/1270.html. [2005, June 25].
Avocado? Melon? A Fruitcake? (2004, September 17). The West Australian, p.9.
Bachelard, M & Denhohn, M. (2004, September 1). Greens eye the balance of power.
The Australian, p. 5.
Bean, C. (1997). The Australian Democrats after twenty years: electoral performance
and voting support. In J. Warhurst (Ed.) Keeping the bastards honest: the
Australian Democrats'first twenty years (pp.69-86). St Leonards: Allen &

'Unwin.
Bean, C., & Papadakis, E. (1995). Minor parties and independents: electoral bases and
future prospects. Australian Journal ofPolitical &ience, 30 (Special Issue),
111-126.
Benham, C. (2004, September 3). Ruddock under fire for exploiting hostage crisis.
The Sydney Morning Herald, p.8.
Bennett, S. (1999). Research paper 101998-99. The decline in supportjar Australia's
major parties and the prospect ofminority government [on-line]. Available
WWW: http://www.aph.gov.au!librarv/pubs/rp/rp98-99.htm. [2004, August 15].
Bennett, S., Newman, G., & Kopras, A (2005). Commonwealth election 2004 [online]. Available WWW: htto://www.aph.gov.au!librazy. [2005, April I].
Beresford, Q., & Phillips, H. (1999). Australian political culture and the rise of One
Nation: towards an interpretation. Australian Studies, 6 (1 ), 31-43.
Bolt, A (2004a, September 5). Why Green should be put last on all vote cards. The
Courier Mail, p.56.
Bolt, A (2004b, September 1). Greens means mad. Herald Sun, p.19
Brown, B., & Singer, P. (1996). The Greens. Melbourne: The Text Publishing
Company.
Brown, [Senator] B. (2005, March 7). Herald Sun found guilty of irresponsible
journalism and seriously misleading readers [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.greens.org.aulmediacentre/mediareleases/senatorbrown/040305a.
[2005, March 7].
"Brown, [Senator] B. (2004a, September 30). Extreme right ads false and defamatory:

44

Family First 'crossing to the other side of the road' [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www. greens.org.au/mediacentre/mediareleases/senatorbrown/. [2004,
December 25].
Brown, B. (2004b, September 28). Greens: what you wiH get. Herald Sun, p.20.
Business warns of Green threat. (2004, September 3). The West Australian, p.9.
Christoff: P. (1994). Environmental politics. In J. Brett, J. Gilk:espie & M. Goot
(Eds.), Developments in Australian politics (pp.348-367). South Melbourne:
Macmillan Education Australia.
Coleman, E. (2004a, October 5). 'Besieged' Greens boosted. The Australian, p.8.
Coleman, E. (2004b, August 31 ). Kooky policy agenda for Greens. The Australian, p.

4.
Contractor, A (2004, October 4). Greens vote lift makes it third force, poll shows.
The Sydney Morning Herald, p.7.
CosteHo, P. (2004, September 23). Wllen crazy joins ioopy. Herald Sun, p.24.
Crabb, A. (2005). Losing it. The inside story of the Labor Party in Opposition.
Sydney: Picador Pan Macmillan Australia.
Crabb, A., & Heinrichs, P. (2004, September 19). Democrats strike Family First deal.
The Age, p.2.
Denhohn, M. (2004, September 17). Omens look good for rising star of Greens. The
Australian, p.6.
Dodson, L. (2004, October 4 ). Greens surge as Coalition holds its lead. The Sydney

Morning Herald, p.l.
Drug ads irk Greens. (2004, October 2). The Courier Mail, p.4.
Economou, N. (2002 ). 'Green 'peiformances in Australian federal elections: much
ado about nothing? Paper delivered to the APSA 50 Conference.
Forrest, J. (1995). Sources of electoral support for the Australian Democrats in the
House ofRepresentatives and Senate elections of1990 and 1993: a comparative
analysis. Australian Journal ofPolitical Science, 30 (3), 568-580.
Green, A (2004). Australia votes: 2004 federal election. State-by-state Senate
predictions [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://abc.net.au/elections/federai/2004/guide/senatetickets.htm. [2005,
September 5].
'

Greens 'just extremists'. (2004, September 29). The Mercury, p.4.
Greens launch. (2004, September 13). The Advertiser, p.6.

45

Greens to pick up four seats, says Brown. (2004, September 25). The West Australian,
p.8.
Greens (WA). (n.d.). History ofthe Greens (WA) [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://wa.greens.org.aulaboutlbistory. [2005, February 24].
Guerrara, 0. (2004, September 6). 'Labor-Green bloc' warning. The Age, p.7.
Hayes, S. (2004a, September 7). Industry body backs Greens' tech policy. T'he
Australian, p.34.
Hayes, S. (2004b, September 28). Greens say buy back Telstra shares. The Australian,
p.34.
Hutton, D., & Connors, L. (1999). A history of the Australian environment movement.
Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
Jaensch, D., & Mathieson, D. (1998). A plague on both your houses. Minor parties
In Australia. St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin.
Jones, A (2004a ). Alan Jones Today Show editorial. The Greens 31 August 2004 [online]. Available WWW: http://2gb.com/cgi-bin/501/501-2gbnews.pi?A=PrintStory&ID=2301. [2005, June 25].
Jones, A (2004b). Alan Jones Today Show editorial. The Greens 30 September [online]. Available WWW: http://2gb.com/cgi-bin/501/501-2gbnews.pl?A=PrintStory&ID=2394. [2005, June 25].
Karvelas, P. (2004, September 7). Brown & co 21st century 'commies'. The
Australian, p.7.
Kerin, J., & Colman, E. (2004, September 1). Terror threat warning. The Australian,
p.8.
Kerr, C. (2004). Green arithmetic and doctors' wives- the election 2004. ReviewInstitute of Public Affairs. 56 (3 )5 6-8.
Kingston, M. (2004). Not happy, John! Defending our democracy. Camberwell:
Penguin Books.
Kirchheimer, 0. (1996). The transformation ofWest European party systems. In J.
LaPalombara & M. Weiner (Eds. ), Political parties and political development.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Lapkin, T. (2004, October 6). Green on the outside, empty inside. The Sydney
Morning Herald, p.l9.
Lateiine. (2004a, September 22). Bartlett, Brown defend effectiveness ofminor parties
[on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.abc.net.au!lateline/content/2004/s1205040.htm. [2005, June 25].
Lateline. (2004b, September 20). Greens, Democrats squabble over preforences [on46

line]. Available w-ww:
http://www.abc.net.au/lateline/content/2004/s1203359.htm. [2005, Jlme 25].
Latham eyes Lodge but Greens the big movers. (2004, September 29). The Mercury,
p.4.
Latham, M. (2005). The Latham diaries. Carlton: Melbourne University Press.
Lohrey, A (2004a, September 27). Are Brown's Greens really feral? The Age, p.ll.
Lohrey, A (2004b, September 27). The other guards may end up being green toowith envy. The Sydney Morning Herald, p.17.
Lohrey, A (2002). Groundswell. The rise ofthe Greens. Quarterly Essay, 8 (2),
1-86.
Mackerras, M. (2004a, September 24). Hawke's Senate bonus for Coalition. The
Australian, p.8.
Mackerras, M. (2004b, August 30). Senate's the only sure bet. The Australian, p.6.
MacLean, S., & Sinclair, L. (2004, October 7). Small player, big budget. The
Australian, p.31.
Mair, P., & Katz, S. (1997). Party organisation, party democracy, and the emergence
of the cartel party. In P. Mair (Ed.), Party System Change. Oxford: Clarendon
Press.
Manning, H & Rootes, C. (2005). The tainted triumph of the Greens: the Australian
national election of9 October 2004. Environmental Politics, 14 (3), 403-408.
Marr, D., & Wilkinson, M. (2003). Dark victory. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin.
Marriner, C. (2004, October 5). Coalition letter drop to scare Green voters. The
Sydney Morning Herald, p.7.
Mayer, H. (1980). Big party Chauvinism and minor party romanticism. In H. Mayer &
H. Nelson (Eds.),Australian Politics. Afifth ~eader (pp.345-360). Melbourne:
Longman Cheshire.
. McManus, G. (2004a, August 31 ). Greens back illegal drugs; open door plan for all
refugees; family home tax; gay marriage nod. Herald Sun, p.3.
McManus, G. (2004b, August 31). Dual policy on Drugs. Herald Sun, p.4.
Meet the Press. (2004a, October 3). Interviews with Greens leader Senator Bob Brown
and Newspoll Managing Director Sol Lebovic [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.ten.com.aulmain idx.aspx?section=newWeather. [2005, July 26].
·Meet the Press. (2004b, September 5). Interview with Treasurer Peter Costello [online]. Available WWW:
http://www.ten.com.aulmain idx.aspx?section=newWeather. [2005, July 26].
47

Middleton, K. (2004a, September 29). Bartlett blasts Greens over Labor. The West
Australian, p.1 0.
Middleton, K. (2004b, September 25). Blue-ribbon seats go Green. The West
Australian, p. 8.
Middleton, K. (2004c, September 13). Greens launch attack on Howard. The West
Australian, p. 11.
Middleton, K. (2004d, September 11). Latham's campaign just got harder. The West
Australian, p.6.
Middleton, K. (2004e, September 10). Security back to centre stage in poll campaign.
The West Australian, p.6.
Middleton, K. (2004( September 9). Greens are in the fight this time. The West
Australian, p. 7.
Middleton, K. (2004g, August 31 ). US expert warns of terror bid. The West
Australian, p.9.

Minor parties [Video]. (n.d.). Television Productions Unit Box Hill Collage ofTAFE:
Box Hill, Victoria.
Miragliotta, N. (1999). T1·ading preferences: The Greens, small parties and
representation in the Australian Senate. Unpublished doctoral dissertation;
University of Western Australia, Perth, Western Australia.
Mitchell, M., Dodson, L., & Moore, M. (2004, September 11 ). They'li strike again,
says PM. The Sydney Morning Herald, p.l.
Moore, M., & Romples, K. (2004, September 10). Evil at our gate. The Sydney
Morning Herald, p. 1.
Murray, P. (2004, September 25). Beware the lurker in the forest. The West
Australian, p.19.
Nettle, [Senator] K, (2004, September 13). Greens set to empower women in
parliament and community [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www. green.org.au/mediacentre/mediareleases/senatornettle/. [2004,
December 25].
Newman, G. (2005). Federal election results 1949-2004 [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.aph.gov.aullibnuy. (2005, April1].
Newspoli/The Australian. (n.d.). Political and issues trends. Federal voting intention
and leaders' ratings. Voting intention [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.newspoll.com.au/cgi-bin/display poli data.pl. [2005, May 27].
Nicholson, B., & Shaw, M. (2004, September 4). Ruddock did not exploit siege: PM.
48

The Age, p.&!
Norman, J. (2004, September 7). Attacks on Brown wont fool voters. The Australian,
p.7.
Norman, J. (2004). Bob Brown. Gentle Revolutionary. Crows Nest Allen & Unwin.
Papadakis, E., & Bean, C. (1995). Independents aild minor parties: the electoral
system. Australian Journal ofPolitical Science, 30 (Special Issue), 97-110.
Pearson, C. (2004, September 4-5). Extremist shade of green. The Weekend
Australian, p.20.
Pennells, S. (2004, October 8). Greens wiii hit the mainstream. The West Australian,
p.16.
Price, M. (2004, September 9). Bobbing blissfully in days of sunshine. The
Australian, p. 7.
Ramsey, A. (2005, March 5). The ABC's got nothing on this for media bias [on-line].
Available WWW: http://www.smh.com.au/news/Alan-Ramsey/The-ABCs-gotnothing-on-this-for-media-bias/2005/03/04/11 09700677368.htm1. [2005, July
31].
Rehn, A. (2004, September 7). Anderson fears Reds under the Greens. The Mercury,
p.4.
Richmond, K (1978). Minor parties in Australia.· In G. Starr, K. Richmond & G.
Maddox (Eds.), Political parties in Australia (pp.317-385). Richmond:
Heinemann Educational Australia.
Rootes, C. (2002). Greens and the environment in the Australian election of
November 2001. Environmental Politics, II (2), 145-153.
Roy Morgan Research. (2003a). Morgan Poll trends. Federal voting intention trend
(I996 to 2005) -House ofRepresentatives [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.roymorgan.com/news/pollsffrends.c:fin? [2005, March 20].
Roy Morgan Research. (2003b ). Morgan poll trends. Federal two party preferred
(2004 to 2005)- House ofRepresentatives [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://www.roymorgan.com/news/poll/Trends.cfin? [2005, May 27].
Ruse, B., & Middleton, K. (2004, September 20). PM in terror challenge. The West
Australian, p.l 0.
Russell, C. (2004, September 18). Green outside, red ink inside. The West Australian,
p.77.
Saliba, C. (2005). Who's afraid of the Greens? [on-line]. Available WWW:
http://webdiary. smh.com.au/archives/margo kingston/000857 .hnnl. [2005,
April4].

49

Saunders, M. (2004a, September 13). Flavour of protest still strong fur Organ. The
Australian, p.6.
Saunders, M. (2004b, August 30) Greens tum kingmakers. The Australian, p. 5.
Seccombe, M., & Aliard, T. (2004, September 16). Hostage drama politicised, says
ALP. The Sydney Morning Herald, p.9.
Sharman, C. (1999). The representation of small parties and independents in the
Senate. Australian Journal ofPolitical Science, 34 (3), 353-361.
Sheridan, G. (2004, September2). Nothirdpartyinsurance. The Australian, p.l3.
Singleton, G., Aitkin, D., Jinks, B., & Warhurst, J. (2003). Australian political
Institutions. 111 edition. Frenchs Forrest: Longman.
Sunday. (2004a, September 12). Terrorists target Australia [on-line]. Available

WWW:
http://sunday.ninmsn.com.au!sunday/cover stories/article 164l.asp?s=l. [2005,
May 6].
Sunday. (2004b, September 5). Interviews: Bob Brown and Andrew Bartlett [on-line].
Available WWW:
http://sunday.ninemsn.eom.au/sunday/political transcripts/article 1635.asp?s=l.
[2005, June 20].
The 7.30 Report. (2004a, October 4). Family First makes federal debut [on-line].
Available WWW: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2004/s1212902.htm.
[2005, June 26].
The 7.30 Report. (2004b, September 8). Latham woos voters [on-line]. Available
WWW: http://www.abc.net.au/7 .30/content/2004/s11950 15.htm. [2004,
September 9].
The Poll Bludger. (n.d.). Half-Senate election 2004 [on-line]. Available w-w-w:
http://www.pollbludger.com/sen2004.htm. [2005, January 3].
Uren, D. (2004, September 3). Greens pose threat to future growth, says business
group. The Australian, p.8.
Van Onselen, P. (n.d.). Approaching thirty: over the hill or proud of the climb? A
history of the Au.5tralian Democrats. Unpublished Research Note.
Vromen, A, & Gelber, K. (2005). Powerscape: contemporary Australian political
practice. Sydney: Allen & Unwin.
Warhurst, J. (1997). Keeping the bastards honest. The Austraiian Democrats' first
twenty years, St Leonards: Allen & Unwin,
Young, S. (2002). Spot on: the role of political advertising in Australia. Australian
Journal ofPolitical Science, 37 {1), 81-97.

50

40

Aug27/29

Source: Newspoll/The Australian (n.d.).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Sept3/5

Sept10/12

Sept17/19

Sept24/26

Oct1/3

Oct6/7

Oct-09

APPENDIX A
Newspoli/The Australian: 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period
House of Representatives Primary Vote40

-?IE- Other

-*-(3reens

_.__Democrats

-ALP

-+- Coalitit)n

51

41

Sept3-5

Source: AC Nielsen (2004).

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

Sept14-16

Sept21-23

Sept30-0ct2

Oct5-7

Oct-09

APPEND LX A.l
AC Nielsen: 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period
House ofRepresentativ,es Primary Vote41

-+-- Coaliition

"""'*"·Other

~Greens

-......Democrats

......-Labor

52

42

Aug28/29Sept4/5

Source: Roy Morgan Research (2003a).

0

5

10

15

20

2,)·-

30

35

40

45

50

55

Sept11/12

Sept18/19

Sept25/26
Oct2/3

Oct7/8

Oct9/1016/17

APPENDIX A.2
Morgan PoU: 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period
House of Representatives Primary vote42

53

43

Aug27/29

Sept3/5

Source: Newspoll/The Australian (n.d.).

46

47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

Sept10/12 Sept17/19 Sept24/26

Oct1/3

Oct6/7

Oct-09

APPENDIXB
Newspolli/The Australian: 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period
House of Representatives Two Party Preferred Vote43

I;

Coalition

ALP

54

44

Aug28/29Sept4/5

Source: Roy Morgan Research (2003b).

42

44

46

48

50

52

54

56

58

Sept11/12

Sept18/19

Sept25/26

Oct2/3

Oct7/8

Oct9/1016/17

APPEJNDD{ B.l
Morgan Polll: 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period
House: of Representatives Two Party Preferred Vote44

-Ill-ALP

----4~Coalition

55

45

Sept3-5

Source: AC Nielsen (2004).

44

46

48

50

52

54

56

Sept14-16
Sept21··23

Sept30-0ct2

Oct5-7

Oct-09

APPENDIX B.2
AC Nielsen: 2004 Federal Election Campaign
House of Representatives Two Party Preferred Vote45

-+-Coalition
-11-Labor

I

56

APPENDIXC
2004 Federal Election Results: House of Representatives46

Party
Lib/Nat/CLP
ALP
DEM
GRN
FFP
PHON
Other

46

NSW

45.4
+2.6
36.7
+0.3
1.1
-3.2
8.1
+3.3
0.8
+0.8
1.4
-3.4
6.6
+0.4

Vic
46.7
+4.6
40.4
-1.2
1.1
-5.2
7.5
+1.6
2.4
+2.4
0.1
-1.1
1.8
-1.0

ACT

Qld

WA

SA

Tas

49.1
+3.6
34.8
+0.1
1.4
-2.9
5.1
+1.75
3.7
+3.7
2.0
,-5.1
4.0
-0.8

48.7
+6.4
34.7
-2.4
1.5
-3.2
7.7
+1.7
0.2
+0.2
2.5
-3.8
2.1
+1.1

48.4
+2.5
36.8
+3.0
1.9
-8.7
5.4
+1.8
4.3
+4.3
1.1
-3.6
4.6

42.0
+4.9
44.6
-2.6

...!-(\ '7
IV./

..
..

9.9
+2.1
2.8
+2.8
..

..
0.7
+0.1

NT

35.2
+2.8
50.3
+3.3
2.4
-5.6
10.8
+3.7
..
..
..
..
2.2
-1.4

43.8
+3.3
44.3
+1.4
2.4
-2.9
6.2
+2.2
1.1
+1.1
..
..
1.4
-1.2

Aust

46.7
+3.7
37.6
-0.2
1.2
-4.2
7.2
+2.2
2.0
+2.0
1.2
-3.2
4.0
-0.4

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission (2004a, pp. 89-91), Newman (2005, pp.32-3).
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APPENDIX C.l
Greens' Primary Vote by House of Representatives Division47

IDivision
Sydney (NSWIALP)
Grayndler (NSW/ALP)
Cunningham (NSW/ALP)
Melbourne (Vic/ALP)
Bennalong (NSW/Lib)
Denison (Tas/ALP)
Melbourne Ports (Vic/ALP)
Batman (Vic/ALP)
Wills (Vic/ALP)
Kooyong (Vic/Lib)
Richmond (NSW/ALP)
North Sydney (NSW/Lib)
Newcastle (NSWI ALP)
Warringah (NSW;Lib)
Fremantle (WAIALP)
Curtin (WA/Lib)
Bradfield (NSW/Lib)
Higgins (Vic/ALP)
Frazer (ACT/ALP)
Franklin (Tas/ALP)
Wentworth (NSW/Lib)
Macquarie (NSW/Lib)
Page (NSW/Nat)
Mackellar (NSW/Lib)
Canberra (ACT/A_LP)
Throsby (NSW/ALP)
Fairfax (Qld/Lib)
Lyons (Tas/ALP)
Ryan (Qld/Lib)
Berowna (I'~S\V/Lib)
p---Ll... (WA/ AT m
ta UI
J-\.Lr J
Latrobe (Vic/Lib)
Cowper (NSW/Nat)
Brisbane (Qld/ALP)
Lowe (NSW/ALP)
Gellibrand (Vic/ALP)
Griffith (Qld/ALP)
Charlton (NSW/ALP)
Goldstein (Vic/Lib)
Forrest (WA/Lib)
Jagajaga (Vic/ALP)
47

%swing

%vote
21.61
21.08
20.13
18.98
16.37
14.60
14.10
13.93
13.00
12.54
12.37
12.33
11.93
11.81
11.78
11.48
11.45
11.35
11.30
11.18
11.15
10.85
10.82
10.48
10.17
10.11
10.09
9.95
9.76

+6.92
+8.02
+13.49
+3.21
+12.34
+4.15
+2.82
+')
...... "'\LI.
,.., .
+4.72
+1.82
+2.31
+4.67
+4.41
+8.12
+2.72
+2.23
+4.76
+2.54
+3.42
+1.45
+1.38
+2.43
+3.62
+2.41
+3.92
+5.61
+4.61
+2.91

0 hfl
J.VV

-1-A A')

9.58
9.41
9.32
9.26
Y.24
9.08
8.99
8.95
8.86
8.45
8.31

+2.22
+2.01
+3.80
+2.70
+5.04
+2.78
+3.55
+4.01
+2.45
+1.28
+1.74

-1-A
'l Q
11.-'U

'•·•.k

Source: Australian Electoral Commission (2005a, pp.l30-206).
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Swan (WA/ALP)
Bass (Tas/Lib)
Adelaide (SA/ALP)
Robertson (NSW/Lib)
Shortland (NSW/ALP)
Casey (Vic/Lib)
Deakin (Vic/Lib)

Pearce (WAJLib)
Tangney (WA/Lib)
Gil.'llore (NSW/Lib)
McEwen (Vic/Lib)
Mayo (SA/Lib)
Cm·angamite (Vic/Lib)
Eden-Monaro (NSW/Lib)
Kingsford Smith
(NSW/ALP)
Chisholm (Vic/ALP)
Fowler (NSW/ALP)
Isaacs (Vic/ALP)
Stirling (WA/Lib)
Boothby (SA/Lib)
Moore (WA/Lib)
Barton (NSW/ALP)
Bendigo (Vic/ALP)
Cook (NSW/ALP)
Hasluck (WA/Lib)
Maribyrnong (Vic/ALP)
Hughs (NSW/Lib)
Solomon (NT/CLP)
Watson (NSW/ALP)
Ballarat (Vic/ALP)
0' Connor (WA/Lib)
Hume (NSW/Lib)
Leichhardt ( Qld/Lib)
Menzies (Vic/Lib)
Hunter (NSW/ALP)
Indi (Vic/Lib)
Kalgoorlie (WAJLib)
Flinders (Vic/ALP)
Dunkley (Vic/Lib)
Mitchell (NSW!Lib)
Sturt (SA/Lib)
Fisher (Qld/Lib)
Chifley (NSW/ALP)
Corio (Vic/ALP)
Dickson (Qld/Nat)
Lilley (Qld/ALP)
·Braddon (Tas!Lib)
Cowan (WAIALP)
Lingiati (NT/ALP)

8.29
8.10
7.99
7.95
7.89
7.87
7.86
7.85
7.80
7.78
7.65
7.60
7.51
7.44
7.37

+2.41
+1.86
+2.02
+4.63
+3.77
+0.98
+1.56
+0.63
+2.77
+2.29
+0.41
+2.13
+1.19
+2.46
+0.10

7.34
7.34
7.31
7.15
7.11
7.08
6.95
6.93
6.92
6.86
6.86
6.79
6.77
6.77
6.73
6.73
6.50
6.47
6.46
6.44
6.43
6.33
6.27
6.24
6.20
6.06
6.05
6.04
5.91
5.87
5.63
5.61
5.59
5.58

+1.17
+4.89
+3.35
+1.17
+3.93
+1.66
+4.05
+1.29
+3.36
+1.19
+2.17
+2.23
+1.63
+3.29
+0.07
+2.00
+2.16
+1.23
+0.97
+1.92
+2.47
+2.55
+0.39
+0.62
+3.07
+2.28
+1.87
+4.33
+1.55
+2.35
+1.88
+0.13
+1.53
+2.78
59

Port Adelaide (SA/ALP)
Hotham (Vic/ALP)
Moreton (Qld/Lib)
Prospect (NSW/ALP)
Kingston (SA/Lib)
Parramatta (NSW/ALP)
Calwell (Vic/ALP)
Reid (NSW/ALP)
Bruce (Vic/ALP)
McPherson (Qld/Lib)
Hindmarsh (SA/ALP)
Gorton (Vic/ALP)
Canning (WA/Lib)
Scullin (Vic/ALP)
Dobell (NSW/Lib)
Herbert (Qld/Lib)
Moncrieff (Qld/Lib)
Bonner (Qld!Lib)
Aston (Vic/Lib)
Brand (WAIALP)
Bowman (Qld/Lib)
Lyne (NSW/Nat)
Banks (NSW/ALP)
Blaxland (NSW/ALP)
Petrie (Qld/Lib)
Gwidir (NSW/Nat)
McMilla.n (Vic/T~ib)
Macarthur (NSW/Lib)
Holt (Vic/ALP)
Wide Bay (Qld/Nat)
Oxley (Qld/ALP)
Gippsland (Vic/Nat)
Wannon (Vic/Lib)
Riverina (NSW/Nat)
Fadden (Qid/Lib)
Paterson (NSW/Lib)
Wakefield (SA/Lib)
Lalor (Vic/ALP)
Barker (SA/Lib)
Forde (Qld/Lib)
Groom (Qld/Lib)
Longman (Qld/Lib)
Makin (SA/Lib)
Mallee (Vic/Nat)
Greenway (NSW/Lib)
Farrer (NSW/Lib)
Kennedy (Qld/Ind)
·Li..'ldsay (NSW/Lib)
Parkes (NSW/Nat)
Hinkler (Qld/Nat)

5.42
5.39
5.31
5.31
5.30
5.30
5.26
5.25
5.24
J:;:1Q
- ' • .l.V

5.11
<:11'1
J.lV

5.05
5.03
5.02
5.02
4.98
4.93
4.86
4.83
4.79
4.76
4.68
4.64
4.62
4.48
4.48
4.47
4.46
4.43
4.40
4.38
4~35

4.30
4.24
4.16
4.15
4.12
4.08
4.08
4.00
3.98
3.79
3.78
3.60
3.59
3.53
3.49
3.42
3.33

+1.561
+1.04
+1.47
+0.73
+1.96
+2.21
+1.91
+2.24
+1.07
+0.25
+1.49
+2.04
-0.31
+2.23
+2.07
+2.30
+0.72
+1.92
+1.32
+1.35
+2.18
+1.79
+1.87
+2.02
+1.93
+2.76
-0.89
+1.42
+1.74
+2.32
+1.05
+0.46
+0.66
+1.87
+0.96
+1.44
+1.00
-0.49
+0.98
+1.07
+0.45
+1.00
+1.47
+1.47
+0.96
+0.17
+1.40
+1.00
+0.89
+0.88
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New England (NSW/Ind)
Grey (SA/Lib}
Dawson (Qld/Nat)
Werriwa (NSW/ ALP)
Rankin (Qld/ALP)
Murray (Vic/Lib)
Blair (Qld/Lib)
Calare (NSW/Indl
Capricornia (Qld/ALP)
Maranoa (Qld/Nat)

3.33
3.30
3.19
3.13
3.09
3.05
2.94
2.30
2.05
2.00

+1.07
+0.87
+0.74
+0.48
+0.34
+0.64
-0.20
+0.77
+0.54
+0.08
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APPENDIXD
2004 Federal Election Results: Senate48

Party
Lib/Nat!CLP
ALP
DEM
GRN
FF

PHON
Other

Qld

WA

SA

Tas

44.1
+2.3
36.4
+0.9
2.2
-4.0
7.3

44.1
+4.5
36.1
-0.7
1.9
-5.9
8.8

44.9
+0.8
31.7
-0.0
2.2
-4.5

50.2
+7.7
32.5
-1.7
2.0
-3.9

47.9
+2.4
35.5
+2.5
2.4

46.1
+7.3
33.5
-3.3
0.8
-3.8

37.9
+3.6
41.1
-0.9
2.1
-8.6

+3.0

+2.8

5.4
+2.1

8.1
+2.2

13.3
-0.5

0.6
+0.6
1.9

1.9
+1.9
0.7

3.4
+3.4
3.1

0.8
+0.8
2.4

16.4
+9.1 ' +3.3
..
..

-3.7

-1.8

-6.9

_A t:;.
--r.v

7.5

6.5
-0.9

9.3
+5.1

3.9
-0.7

1

1

-I. I

48

-10.2
6.6
+3.2

4.0
+4.0
1.1
-0.6
2.5
+1.9

ACT

NT

Vic

NSW

2.4
+2.4

Aust

45.4
+1.7
41.4
+2.2
4.7
-2.6
7.6

..

..

..

-3.3

-2.2
2.6

-4.7
0.9
+0.1

3.9
+1.2

1

[\

-r.v

45.1
+3.3
35.0
+0.7
2.1
-5.1
7.7
.L'l.
'?.
J ,.)I.;J

1.8
+1.8
1.7
_'l Q
-_,;Ou

6.7
+0.6

Sources: Australian Electoral Commission (2004a, pp.120-122); Newman (2005, p.54-5).
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49

Source: AEC (2005c).
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Preference distribution NSW Division of Cunningham49
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50

\

Source: ABC (2005d).
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APPENDIX E.l
Preference Distribution NSW Diivision of Sydney50
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51

Source: AEC (2005e).

Full Dist1-ib4tion! ofPreferel~ces

Distriblllttion of Preferences NSW division of Grayndh~r51
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52

Source: AEC (2005±).

Full

istribu~lori ofPrefer~nces

APPENDIX E.3
Preference Distribution Victorian Division of Melbourne52
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PHON

Pauline Hanson's One Nation (PHON)

53

Source: ABC (2004b ).

LFF

GRN

The Greens (GRN)

CEC

APA
APA

Australian Progressive Alliance (APA)
Ticket 1
Ticket2

Liberals for Forests (LFF)

NCP

New Country Party

AD
AD

CDP
CDP
NP

CDP Christian Party (CDP)
Ticket 1
Ticket2
The Nationals (NP)

Australian Democrats (AD)
Ticket 1
Ticket2
Citizens Electoral Council ( CEC)

PLP

Progressive Labour Party (PLP)

Unend.

APA
APA
Unend.

CDP

PLP

AD
AD

CDP

FF
FF
LP

GRN

GRN
APA

NP

LP

ALP
NPP

LFF
LFF
CDP

2

Unend.
Unend.
FF

I

Non-Custodial Parents Party (NPP)

Australian Labor Party (ALP)

Liberal (LP)

Unendorsed
Ticket- 1 (Favours Democrats)
Ticket 2 (Favours the Greens)
Family First (FF)

Political Party

AD

Unend.
Unend.
Ungrp.

CEC

Unend.

FF
FF

NPP

NPP
NPP
Unend.

ALP

NCP

.AD

CDP

AD

CEC
CEC

3

GlRN

LFF
LFF
AD

NPP

AD

LFF
LFF

LP

LP
LP
GlRN

NP

Unend .
Unend.

FF

APA
APA
LP

4

APA

GRN

FF

FF

FF

APA

Unend.
Unend.

FF

NP
NP
APA

AD

CDP
PHON

NCP

NPP
NPP
NP

5

NP

NP
NP
NPP

Ungrp.
ALP
APA

Ungrp.
Ungrp.

NP

NCP
NCP
LFF

APA

FF
CDP

APA

Ungrp.
Ungrp.
NCP

6

LP

GRN
GRN
ALP

LFF

LFF

CDP
CDP

NP

LFF
LFF
AD

Ungr]p.

NP
FF

LFF

AD
GRN
LFF

7

PHON

Ungrp.
Ungrp.
LFF

NP

NP

NP
NP

AD

PHON
PHON
FF

LFF

LFF
CEC

AD

APA

GRN
AD

8

PLP

PLP
PLP
PLP

AD

Ungrp.
LP

GRN
GRN

APA

ALP
CDP

ALP

Unend.

APA
NP

NPP

PLP
PLP
NPP

9

CDP

LP
ALP
APA

PLP

FF

LP
FF

ALP

LP

FF

LP

CEC

ALP

LP

LFF

Ungrp.
Ungrp.
NPP

FF

Ungrp.
Ungrp.

Ungrp.

FF
FF
Ungrp.

II

ALP

ALP

Unend.
Unend.
Ungrp.

CEC

PLP
LFF

Unend.

NCP
NCP
Unend.

10

12

Ungrp.

CDP
CDP
CDP

NCP

Ungrp.

NPP
NPP

Ungrp.

CEC
CEC
ALP

CDP

LIP
PLP

CEC

CDP
CDP
CEC
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NPP

NPP
NPP
PHON

ALP

NPP

PLP
PLP

PLP

APA
APA
PLP

NPP

NPP
LP

PLP

PHON
PHON
PLP

13

NCP

CEC
CEC
NCP

GRN

NCP

CEC
CEC

CEC

PLP
PLP
CEC

NCP

AD

CEC

GRN

NP
NP
PHON

14

CEC

PHON
PHON
NP

Ungrp.

CDP

NCP
NCP

Unend.

GRN
G/ALP/G
NCP

Ungrp.
LP

NCP
AJLP

ALP

ALP
ALP
ALP

15

ALP

NCP!Ungrp
NCP/Ungrp.
LP

Unend.

PHON

PHON
PHON

GRN

PHON

AD
AD

PHON

PHON
GRN

PHON

LP
LP
GRN

16
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The Greens proposed
"loopy laws" could
get support from
Labor and be passed.

all

The· Labor/Greens
. preference deal could
hand Government to
Labor;

all
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Liberal Party Advertising: 'The Greens-Labor Deal'
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APPENDIX G.l
Greens' Political Advertising: 'Greens' Policies Save Children's Lives' 55

ADVERTISEMENT

GREENS' POLICIES SAVE
.... CHILDREN'S LIVES
Dear Friend,
Over ma..'ly years, as a doctor and as ·a senator, I have advised young people to avoid
illicit drugs. I have also worked to help addicts (people caught up in drugs and huit:ing
both themselves and others) w·-ged)ack to a good life in society.
Two factors make dr..:tg abuse worse. One is the criminal dealers- they should be
jailed. The other is the narrow view that c:riminalises young addicts -and d,.'"ives their
activities underground.

ln this election, notable for the other pa..'i:ies avoiding drug policies, the Greens have
been targeted by the Murdoch tabloids, the Coalition and religious right, even though
our policies would reduce the death toll fi::orr; drug misuse i.'i Australia.· On the other
ha.c'ld, Fa.c-nily First, ·when asked for its drugs policy this week, did not produce any.
Here are some points the religious.right parties will not face.
• The Greens back tough laws to jail drug dealers.
·• We want youngsters who get caught up with hard drugs to get help. They should
not be left abandoned in back alleys. The religious right should read about the
Good Samaritan.
• Prohibition breeds cri.ille and corruption.
• Overseas experience tri.alling policies w'b.Jch reduce the death rate from addiction
should be co~sidered here. A -referendum in Switzerland won 70% popular
support for heroin treatment clinics, because they reduce harm.
• Highly qualified police, medical experts and ev~n right wing think tanks support
harm minimisation.
Harm minimisation has been successfully implemented in countries like Canada,
Switzerland and Portugal. We advocate its adoption in Austi:al.i.a· to save young
Austi:al.i.an lives.
Yours sincerely

~·SenatOr Bob Brown
Australian Greens
1 October 2004

.Bob Brown-

+ L---------------------------------~------~----~_o_,_.&m_.
__.s_~
__._M_a_n_ne_~
__·_ro_s_u_l~-in_~_-~
__._~__TAS--·7-0oo
__.~-----J
36 llla Advertiser

55

www.theadvertlser.com.au

lllursday, October 7, 2004

Source: The Advertiser, p.36 (2004, October 7).
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APPENDIX G.2
Timber Communities Australia: 'Recipe for Establishing a Green Party' 56

1. OPPOSE job creation
2. OPPOSE major investment in Tasmania
3. OPPOSE all e<:onomic growth

4. OPPOSE a sustainable foresfrndustry

fP

,;; .

5. PROMOn a population redltctiotr$'
6. PROMOn an open door on
7. PROMOn social drug use,

8. PROMOTE vegetarianism
9. PROMOn public funding
10. PROMOn higher dole

11. PROM01i higher

: ::'.

.~..

;

-

···:.;

~B!own!

:·

~-cc~lf~

Chnst1ne Milne a~d
The Greens revel an
•
reducing Tasmania
. to a bitsket case•••

\.. SUPPORT TASMANIA
li

t!I

· ••• they've done it
_,efore and they
will do it again.

56

Source: Th~ Mercury, p.44 (2004, October 8).

10

APPENDIX G.3
Forest Industries Association of Tasmania: 'A Latham Puppet Government' 57

A

GOVERN ME
1---Al-lHBrown used to talk
about having Ha firm
:hand on the shoulder of
government". Now he
,wants to pull the strings,
I

i :

-Labor's forests policy
confirms Bob Brown
is the Puppeteer and
tham the Puppet.
......................

A Latham Labor Governmen ··will be
a Puppet Government of the Greens.
Authorised by Terry Edwards, Forest Industries Association of Tasmania, 38 Montpelier Retreat, Battery Point 7004.

57

Source: The Mercury, p.15 (2004, October 7).
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APPENDIXH
Content Analysis of News Reports on the Australian Greens in the
Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period

The Australian
· 30 August
Greens turn king makers
31 August
'Kooky' policy agenda for Greens
1
Greens eye the balance of power
September
Brown returns :fire on his drugs
policy
3
Greens pose threat to future
September
growt..P., says business group
Brown & co 21st century
7
'commies'
September
Industry body backs Greens'
tech policy
9
Bobbing blissfully in days of
September
sunshine
Flavour of protest still strong
13
September for Organ
Live with planet, not off it:
Brown
Greens preference 'blank' poised
to fell Labor
17
Greens flirt with Howard
September

18/19
September
20
September

22
September
24
September
28
Septe1p..ber

29
September

.Reporter(s)

Title

Date

Omens look good for rising star
Of Greens
Labor & Greens do national
deal
Greens threaten Dems in West

I
Voters overlook tax policy for
trees
Howard sees ALP in Hock
with Greens
Greens in bid to cut rebate on
insurance
Greens patch it up to rout
Turnbull
Greens say buy back Telstra
shares
Greens object to Family First
'dirty work'

Page Classification

M. Saunders 5
E. Coleman
4
M. Bachelard 6
M.Denhohn
E. Coleman
6

Neutral
Unfavourable
Neutral

D. Uren

8

Unfavourable

P.Karvelas

7

Unfavourable

S. Hayes

34

Favourable

M. Price

7

Favourable

M. Saunders

6

Favourable

G. Kaszubska

8

Favourable

E. Coleman

8

Neutral

B.
Norrington
M.Denholm
M. Denholm

1

Neutral

6

Favourable

6

Neutral

6

Neutral

G.
Megalogenis
S. Lewis

7

Neutral

7

Unfavourable

M. Bachelard

7

Favourable

M. Saunders

6

Neutral

S. Hayes

34

Favourable

IS. Lewis
A McGarry
R Martin

!
I

M. Bachelard 7
M.Brockman

Unfavourable

Favourable
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2/3 October

4 October
5 October
7 October

Preference deal a wony for
Beazley
Greens lose the wilderness vote
'Unholy alliance' holds Latham's
key to Lodge
'Besieged' Greens boosted
Greens in blue-ribbon seats
could be gold

The Sydney Morning Herald
30 August
Preferences key, but no decision
yet
Green power surge i11 ru.'l. for
Senate seats as Democrats dive
Anning high in seats of discontent
Minors to do deal
1
September
Drug policy defended
3
Business group on Green alert as
Brown extemalises ·
September
Greens square up to Labor in
dormitory town cliff-hanger
4
Howard promise to save trees and
jobs
September
6
Independents' day as new
September
government faces minority rule
Democrats leader attacks Greens
record
We're on for young and old:
Brown
7
Greens tmder the bed
September
8
Labor not so green
September
9
Greens offer pact with winner
September
11
Every Ridgeway but lose: One
September
Nation, many preference deals
and a Greening of the electoral
vme
13
Jakarta attack result of policy:
September
Wilkie
17
Labor deal may give Greens
September
second NSW Senator
23
Brown sets deadline
September
Greens to block funding increases
to private schools
28
King's bid to woo Greens bits a
September
rocky patch

N. Wilson

10

Neutral

M. Bachelard
B. Lane
S. Lewis

10

Unfavourable

1

Unfavourable

8
E. Coleman
M. Brockman 7

Favourable
Neutral

CBanham

8

Favourable

n.a.

28

~~eutral

C. Matriner
n.a.

28
9

NeutTal
Neutral

n.a.
l Garnaut

9

8

Unfavourable
Uniavourable

S. Peating

9

Favourable

L. Dodson

9

Neutral

A Contractor 6

Neutral

n.a.

6

A Contractor 17

Unfavourable

IFavourable

D. Murphy

8

Unfavourable

n.a.

10

Neutral

A Contractor 6

Favourable

A Contractor 10

Neutral

J. Garnaut

6

Favourable

M. Seccombe
T. Allard
n.a.

9

Neutral

9

Favourable

L. Dodson

11

Favourable

J. Pearlman

6

Neutral
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1 October
4 October

5 October
8 October
9 October
Herald Sun
30 August
31 August

31 August
1
September
3
September
11

How green is Brown's valley
Greens want aid boost
Greens vote lift makes it third
force, poll shows
Coalition letter drop to scare
Green voters
Greens line up for Labor over
forests
Greens expect forest backlash

18
P. Snow
6
n.a.
A. Contractor 7

n.a.

12

Favourable

Polls shmv Greens are sprouting
Greens back illegal drugs; open
door plan for all refugees; family
home tax; gay marriage nod
Dual policy on dmgs
Red-faced Brown backs off
Greens' drug ideas
Farmers fear the Greens could
damage their patch
Brown keen for alliance

G. :rv1clvianus
G. McManus

8
3

Unfavourable
Unfavourable

G. McManus
G. McManus
M.Hanrey

4

5

Unfavourable
Unfavourable

J.

27

Unfavomable

Masanauskas
G. McManus

12

Unfavomable

Howard cops Green blast

n.a.

4

Favourable

Greens at the ready
No deal with Greens

M. Harvey
G. McManus

24
7

Neutral
Unfavourable

Liberals back 'wacky' Greens

G. McManus

2

Unfavourable

Fear of Senate control

n.a.

11

Favourable

Brown lashes Right

L. Heywood

12

Favourable

Fcrests the big issue
Anti-drug chiefblasts Greens
Greens tipped to make $4m profit
on election
40 taxes on longer wish list
Greens kick up a pe\v
Right little earner: Greens policy
shows how cru'lle can pay

G. McManus
N. Wilson
L. Mcilveen

28
30

Unfavourable
Unfavourable
Unfavourable

13
27
7

Unfavourable
Favourable
Unfavomable

7
1, 8

Neutral
Neutral

10

l:'avourable

J. Gordon

l)

Unfavomable

0. Guerrara
0. Guerrara

7

Unfavourable

C. Marriner

7

A. Contractor 9

Favourable
Favourable
Favourable
Unfavomable
Favourable

September
13

September
18
September
20
September
27
September
28
September
2 October
6 October

7 October
8 October
9 October

The Age
30 August
1
September
2

September
'3

September
6

Politics in a darker shade of green
Greens on the boil, as Liberals go
on attack
Wilkie finds deep pockets in
disgruntled voters
Ureens under attack
'Labor-Green bloc' warning

G. McManus
1

n.a.

M.

5

Zonneveldt

J. Koutsoukis

B. Nicholson
1::5.

Nicholson
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September
7
September
9
September
12
September
13
September
18
September
21
September
23
September
26
September
8 October

9 October

Anderson sees red over
'watermelon' Greens
Greens ready to deal: Brown

6

Unfavourable

M. Shaw

8

Favourable

10

Favourable

9

Favourable

9

Neutral

7

Neutral

1(\

Favourable

11

~~

Neutral

9

Favourable

Solar power to the people, say
P. Hudson
Greens
Roar of the crowd and smell of
J. Green
patchouli add colour to bid
Greens strike a preference deal
A Crabb
with Labor
Greens threaten key Labor seats,
A. Crabb
with Lib help
M. Fyfe
n <>
Greens vow to end spending on
wealthy private schools
P. Hudson
Greens tipped to double vote in
Labor seat
Victorian Green with his ey on the :M. Fyfe
Senate
Sap rises as Greens loom in third
A Darby
party role

The Courier Mail
30 August
Hutton looks a chance for Senate
spot
3
Greens. Business concerns
September
4
Greens leader says it's teamwork
September
6
Minor parties poised to claim
September
balance of power, says Brown
Coalition mudslinging fails to
corral Greens
I
9
Greens leader dismisses a Red
September
herring
Greens. No sale pledge
10
Democrats see red over Green Lll
September
roads
11
Preference for Green puts Brown
September
in hot seat
13
Coalition paints Greens black
September
15
Greens. Water key to deal
September
16
Greens jump on the band wagon
September
19
Greens strike deal with Labor
September
20
Greens good for Labor as
September
Democrats keep fading
28
Greens siam 'faceless' deals

~eptember

M. Blenkin

.I..I..U.

~v

;

;

11

Favourable

M. Cole
L. Heywood
n.a.

5

Favourable

7

Unfavourable

L. Mcilveen

10

Favourable

C. Jones

4

Neutral

C. Jones

9

Favourable

L. Mcilveen

15

Unfavourable

n.a.
J. Walker
L.Heywood
J. Walker

15
8

Favourable
Neutral

8

Favourable

G. Johnstone

4

Unfavourable

n.a.

5

Favourable

:M. Phillips

15

Favourable

n.a.

15

Neutral

L. Johnstone

5

Neutral

L. Heywood

4

Favourable

I __!___ --

--
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September
2 October
4 October
5 October
7 October

Drug ads irk Greens
Greens. Labor backed
Greens. Workplace bid
Greens. No negotiations

The West Australian
1
Greens policy spells out line on
September drug use
3
Business warns of Green threat
September
6
Labor warned on Green vote
September
Greens claim backing from
young, over 50s
7
Exchange adds fruit flavour to
September campaign
Brown to launch Green policy in
WA visit
9
Brown to deal with either side
September
Greens are in the fight this time
13
Greens launch attack on Howard
September
Wilkie targets PM on security
after bombing
Rock rhythms set mood for tree
lovers
17
Avocado? Melon? A fruit cake?
September
20
Greens deal lifts Labor hopes
September
21
Scare ploy has helped us: Siewert
September
Greens plan higher taxes
22
Former spook stalks PM
September
24
Ban party donations, says Brown
September
25
Blue-ribbon seats tum blue
September
Greens to pick up four seats, says
Brown
29
Greens protest over drug peddling
September advert
Bartlett blasts Greens over Labor
Beazley see red over Greens
2 October
voting rebuff
·4 uctober
Brown throws down gauntlet on
old forests

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

4
5
9
16

Unfavourable
Favourable
Favourable
Unfavourable

n.a.

9

Neutral

n.a.

9

Unfavourable

D. Grand

10

Neutral

n.a.

11

Favourable

n.a.

10

Neutral

n.a.

10

Neutral

K. Middleton

7

Favourable

K. Middleton
K. Middleton

7
11

Favourable
Favourable

n.a.

11

Favourable

n.a.

11

Unfavourable

n.a.

9

Unfavourable

D. LeGrand
K. Gauntlett
K. Gauntlett

11

Neutral

10

Favourable

C. Russell
R. Taylor

10
11

Unfavourable
Favourable

D. Grand

10

Favourable

K. Middleton

8

Neutral

n.a.

8

Neutral

n.a.

10

Unfavourable

K. Middleton
R. Taylor

10
11

Unfavourable
Unfavourable

n.a.

6

Neutral
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The Advertiser
Greens seek radical drug reforms
31 August
1
Swap deal in Senate
September
Anger at drug policy
3
Greens 'good managers'
September
4
How the Greens vote rates in the
September
Central Market
The farmer who is in Bob
Brown's green comer
Waming on Greens
10
September
Greens launch
13
September
18
Forget it, PM tells Greens on
September policy
20
Greens warn Labor
September
21
Greens a marginal help to Labor
September
Senate hopefuls great sacrifice
Party time. The Greens
22
Greens on rise
September
23
Wilkie on visit
September
25
Anderson's Green envy
September
29
Greens angered by ads
September
2 October
Fringe dwellers
The Mercury
31 August
Greens unveil radical policy
1
Greens sla..m campaign to ha..rm
September policies
Bob's lack of understanding
2
Flak keeps flying on drug policy

G. McManus
n.a.

7

8
8

Unfavourable
Neutral

n.a.
n.a:

5

Unfavourable
Neutral

T.

11

Neutral

Richardson
L. Mcilveen

29

Neutral

n.a.

11

Unfavourable

n.a.

6

Favourable

B. Littlely

21

Neutral

n.a.

13

Neutral

P. Starick
G. Kelton
L. Craig
D. Clarke
n.a.

5

Neutral

22
37
6

Favourable
Neutral
Neutral

n.a.

7

Favourable

n.a.

19

Unfavourable

n.a.

31

Unfavourable

C. Bildstien

31

'Neutral

G. McManus
E. \Vhinnett

3
4

Unfavourable
Unfavourable

n.a.
A Rehn

5
4

Unfavourable
Unfavourable

L. Mcilveen

7

Unfavourable

S~ember

4
September

5
September
7
September

'8

Nonnally silent partner speaks his
mind on Bob
Brown calls on Lennon to act

n.a.

•7

Neutral

Anderson fears Reds under the
Greens
Greens back single zone
Greens bash by PM backfires

A Rehn

4

Unfavourable

n.a.
n.a.

4
5

Favourable
Favourable

Brown offers stuffed koalas

n.a.

7

Neutral

September
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9
September
13
September

Greens under the bed won't work,
says Brown
Milne set for Senate return

14
September

Greens make a devout Christian
see red
More women need electing to
reflect society, says Milne
Greens call for ban on super
trawlers
Greens rescue plan for forests

15
September
16
September

17
September
19
September
20
September

22
September
23
September
25
September
29
September
5 October
8 October

L. Mcilveen

4

Unfavourable

C.
Waterhouse
S. Bailey
C. Konkes

1-2

Favourable

8

Unfavourable

I'1.a.

8

Favourable

n.a.

4

Favourable

n.a.

3

Favourable

Greens would do away with states
Greens demand action of super
trawlers
Nat mushes Green avocado

E. Whin.."flett
n.a.

7
20

Unfavourable
Favourable

n.a.

4

Unfavourable

Han·adine not a Green
Labor-Greens vote deal

n.a.
n.a.

5

4

Unfavourable
Neutral

Democrats spiteful, says Mi1ne
Brown prefers quick decision

H. Chog
D. Rose

4
5

Neutral
Favourable

Green hop sys he is only Hanson
rival
Greens call for national plan to
halt T assie pests
Greens preference pledge

n.a.

5

Favourable

M. Paine

8

Favourable

n.a.

9

Neutral

Brown tips Greens increase

n.a.

10

Favourable

Greens 'just extremists'

n.a.

4

Unfavourable

Brown hails Labor breakthrough
Greens push for $500 wage for
prisoners
Labor wins Greens preferences

D. Rose
L. Mcilveen

2
4

Favourable
Unfavourable

E. Whinnett

6

Neutral
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APPENDIX I
Content Analysis of Opinion Pieces on the Australian Greens in the
Australian Press During the 2004 Federal Election Campaign Period

Date

Title

Commentator Page Classification

The Australian
2 September Green is not the political go
No third party insurance
4/5
Extremist shade of Green
September
6 September Leaders discover it's not easy being
Greens
7 September Attacks on Brown wont fool voters
15
Fretful candidates feeling a bit
September
Green
'){\
-<..V
BroV\-'11 forsakes forests for poll ease
September
1 October
Save life as we know it -put the
Greens in parliament

Editorial
G. Sheridan
C. Pearson

12
13
20

Negative
Negative
Negative

Editorial

10

Negative

J. Norman

15
15

Positive
Positive

G.1"v1ilne

11

~~

Negative

TI

13

Negative

C. Twyman

51

Positive

A Lohrey

1'1

Positive

T. Lapkin

19

Negative

Herald Sun EDITORIAL
Greens means mad
When crazy joins loopy

Editorial
A Bolt
P. Costello

20
19
24

Negative
Negative
Negative

Greens: what you will get

B. Brown

20

Positive

Editorial

24

Negative

A Masterson

10

Negative

G.

13

Negative

Henderson
A Lohrey

11

Positive

A Bolt

56

Negative

M. Steketee

r.

The Sydney Morning Herald
11
Green? It's colour code for Red
September
27
The other guards may end up being
September
green too - with envy
6 October
Green on the outside, empty inside
Herald Sun
31 August
1 September
23
September
28
September
7 October

Dark shade of Green

The Age
12
The 'watermelon' once again makes
September
a colourful interlude
21
How the Liberals can take revenge
Septetn ber
on Bob Brown
27
Are Brown's Greens really feral?
September
The Courier Mail
5 September Why Green should be last on all
vote cards

I

T"'lo

•
ueVllle
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The West Australian
7 September Pure Green credentials apt to fade
18
Green outside, red ink inside
September
21
Preferences are poll revenge
September
25
Beware the lurker in the forest
September
Greens w1Jl hit the mai..nstream
8 October

T. Rutherford 19
C. Russell
77

Negative
Negative

G.
Henderson
P. Murray

17

Negative

19

Negative

S.Pennells

16

Positive

B. Brown
Editorial

18

28

Positive
Negative

Green grow poll deals

G. Barnes

L.l

..... 1

Negative

If you want to go nowhere ...

P. Akerman

21

Negative

The Advertiser
30 August
A strong voice
2 October
Not the time for political
experiments
The Mercury

20
September
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